

# СТУДЕНТ

## STUDENT

February 1980  
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## ETUDIANT

ГАЗЕТА УКРАЇНСЬКОГО СТУДЕНТСТВА КАНАДИ

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CANADA'S NEWSPAPER FOR UKRAINIAN STUDENTS



# "Welcome to the 1980's"

A generation from now, chroniclers of Canadian politics will likely view the winter election campaign of 1979-80 as one of the most amazing pieces of chicanery ever to beguile the Canadian electorate. They will record a story that is truly stranger than fiction. It is one in which Pierre Elliott Trudeau regains the leadership of the Liberal Party and leads them on to a smashing victory, only a scant few weeks after he had apparently closed the last act on his political career in announcing his retirement as party leader. Only a politician as skilled as Trudeau in the Machiavellian art of politics could have manipulated circumstances so successfully as to catapult himself back into power as if he were staging his own coronation.

Trudeau's political resurrection will be cause for gloating for Keith Davey and the Liberal Party backroom boys. During the election campaign, Trudeau was able to bask in the glow of the extravagant accolades prematurely extended to him by even his most vociferous opponents in the wake of his announced retirement. He sufficiently refurbished his tarnished image to defuse it as a political issue. Trudeau was able to run on his established reputation as a forceful, if combative, leader. By avoiding any policy commitments during the election campaign, the Liberals managed to maintain the public focus almost exclusively on the tattered image of the Conservative government after barely six months in office. The election campaign could hardly have been better orchestrated, had the script been written by the Liberal Party itself.

It was a cynical campaign, largely devoid of issues, which sorely abused the intelligence of the voters. We were being encouraged to elect a party without a substantial platform, led by a leader who planned to keep his commitment to retire soon after the election. The ostensible reason for this was to save the country the indignity of having to suffer Joe Clark's leadership any longer. Given the success of the Liberal tactics, it is easy to see other parties following suit in future elections — it may no longer be necessary to commit oneself to any policy or principle in running for political office in Canada.

Essentially, the Conservatives had set themselves up for their ignominious fall from office last December. John Crosbie's arrogant demeanour in putting forth a "bodjet" which asked the people of Canada to cut their standard of living, while at the same time promising to dispense with Petro-Canada as a Crown Corporation (in order to keep the world safe for Exxon Corporation), produced an unsaleable package. It required a straining of credibility to accept advice to tighten one's belt from a multi-millionaire Finance Minister. Clark appeared equally arrogant in his refusal to admit the possibility that they may have been wrong in presenting such Draconian measures at this time. Clark and his entourage persisted to the end of the campaign in what one newsmen described as "a bunker mentality," convinced that victory was still within their grasp even though all evidence had pointed to the imminent collapse of their political fiefdom for several months.

The Clark image, of course, had a great deal to do with the poor showing of the Conservatives in the election. Various portrayed by the press as a buffoon, an incompetent or a characterless personality, he became the victim of cruel jokes which effectively destroyed his credibility. The disturbingly partisan tone of the press in ravaging the party leaders was particularly pronounced in this election, precisely because there were no real issues ever discussed during the campaign. The Toronto Star reverted to its old loyalties in endorsing the Liberals even before they had announced a policy platform. The conservative Edmonton Journal re-inforced its xenophobic image by publishing a vicious attack on Trudeau in an election editorial, proclaiming that "the Liberal fox must be kept out of the

Alberta chicken house." No doubt the Journal also felt that Clark was capable of protecting the chicken house, although it did have some serious reservations about his strongly anti-Soviet foreign policy speech before 2,000 Ukrainian Canadians at Massey Hall in Toronto, "as rabidly anti-communist an audience as could ever hope to be conjured up."

By the time that election day finally arrived, it was apparent that most people were relieved to see the campaign end. There was little excitement elicited from most Canadians in the midst of the snows of a frigid February. The only touch of originality came from the "other" candidates in the election, most notably the Rhinoceros Party. So we trekked off to their campaign headquarters on election night to

watch the results. On the way, we stopped by the local Alberta Liquor Control Board outlet just before the polls were closed. As a sign of the times, there was already a line-up in front of the liquor store, but none in front of the polling booths. It seems that many people consider elections in Alberta about as exciting as those in the U.S.S.R.

The lifting of the news blackout on election returns at eight o'clock M.S.T. revealed that the Liberals already had a majority government, even before the votes from Alberta and B.C. had begun to be counted. Small wonder, one muses, that Westerners feel alienated from the federal political system. The mood inside Rhinoceros Party headquarters was jubilant as the initial returns showed that Rhino candidates were outpolling Social Credit all over the province — the birthplace of Aberhart's movement, no less. The Rhinos — who have succeeded in pushing the politics of negativism to the ultimate extent — have apparently tapped a well of discontent within the Canadian electorate about the entire political system. "Just think how well we might have done had we actually campaigned," one incredulous Rhinoceros supporter exclaimed.

The success of the Rhinoceros campaign is reflective of the low state to which Canadian political life has fallen. The growing support for anti-candidates, such as those in the Rhinoceros Party, shows that many people are growing increasingly tired of the childish political advertising campaigns propagated by the old line parties. The Rhinos have been particularly successful in provinces where one party has completely dominated political life, as in Quebec and in Alberta. Today, we witness a serious erosion of the democratic system as votes for the opposition parties in these provinces are not reflected in terms of representation in the House of Commons. These parties have become virtually irrelevant in these provinces, and can generate little enthusiasm.

One rational solution to this

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disjunction would be to introduce some form of proportional representation, thereby giving all major parties representation in all regions of the country and making the electoral system equally sensitive to changes in popular vote in all provinces. The gross disparities in the current electoral system, whereby a shift of 5% of the voters in Ontario can cause sufficient seats to switch from the Conservatives to the Liberals to give the latter a majority government, have given Ontario a disproportionate influence in determining the outcome of federal elections in recent years. If we are to avoid the continued spectre of a Quebec without Conservative and NDP representation and a West without Liberals, we must sooner or later introduce proportional representation into the electoral system of Canada. The alternative is to continue the marked polarization which is so evident in this election's results.



HI THERE!  
ARE YOU A TYPICAL AVERAGE  
VOTER WHO WANTS TO KNOW  
THE TRUTH? WELL, I'M YOUR  
TYPICAL AVERAGE CANDIDATE  
WHO WANTS YOUR VOTE! SO,  
LET'S CUT THE CRAP OUT &  
MAKE A DEAL! FIRST OF ALL,  
JUST LIKE YOU, I'M A NOBODY.  
HELL MY PARTY'S LEADER  
CAN'T EVEN REMEMBER MY  
NAME BUT THAT'S FINE BY  
ME BECAUSE I CAN'T  
REMEMBER WHAT HIS  
POLICIES ARE. THAT'S  
WHY THEY GIVE US  
ALL THOSE PAMPHLETS.  
THEREFORE, YOU CAN  
REST ASSURED THAT I'M  
NOT CABINET MATERIAL.  
IF WE'RE LUCKY, YOU WON'T  
EVEN HEAR MY NAME AT  
ALL UNTIL THE NEXT  
ELECTION! AND, WHY  
SO HUMBLE, YOU ASK?  
SIMPLE. TELL ME AN  
EASIER WAY TO MAKE  
\$41,300.00 A YEAR?

## Anti-Grigorenko campaign condemned

# Defense committees plan for future actions

NEW YORK (CDSP) — Committees in Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners (CDSP) from across North America (Edmonton, Montreal, New York, Philadelphia and Toronto) held a conference 19 January in New York City to discuss preparations for actions to be undertaken at the Helsinki accords review conference in Madrid, scheduled for November 1980.

Approximately thirty CDSP members took part in the conference along with three former political prisoners — Raisa Moroz, Nadia Svitlychna and Nina Strokata. General Petro Hryhorenko, the head of the Western Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, was unfortunately unable to attend because of his involvement in an automobile accident en route to the conference site.

The conference participants agreed to initiate a

"press and information bureau" in Madrid, which would operate prior to and during the Madrid conference. The bureau would operate as both an information pool on violations of the Helsinki accords and a resource center to facilitate the convention of press conferences, issuing of news releases, organization of demonstrations and other media-related events.

The proposed bureau would be at the disposal of the Western Representatives of the Armenian, Lithuanian, Russian and Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Groups, as well as any groups or individuals interested in the Helsinki issue from any of the accords' thirty-five signatory countries. This would include groups such as trade unions, civil rights organizations and legal associations. The political basis for participation was determined by the conference to be

the defense of democratic rights in both the East and the West. Support will not be sought from those groups or individuals who, while denouncing the lack of democratic rights in the Soviet Union, support political repression in other countries.

The conference underscored the importance of continued systematic defense of arrested members of the five Soviet Helsinki monitoring groups, and especially the defense of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group which has been the major target of Soviet repression.

Two publications, to appear before the Madrid hearings in at least English and Spanish, are to be published by the committees as a result of the conference. One will deal with workers' and trade union rights in the various Helsinki signatory countries, while the other will

focus on documenting the repression of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group.

The conference also adopted a position highly critical of the disgraceful resolution passed by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) at its 15 December 1979 meeting which revoked UCCA support by both General Hryhorenko and the Western Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group. The CDSP conference passed the following resolution dealing with this issue:

Committees in Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners (Edmonton, Montreal, New York, Philadelphia and Toronto) gathered in New York 19 January 1980 to discuss the

(DEFENSE continued on page 14)

# EDITORIAL

## One bad apple does not spoil the barrel

As several articles in this issue of Student indicate, the release of a number of Ukrainian dissident activists from the Soviet Union in the last few years, and especially Valentyn Moroz, has led to considerable confusion and distress among many Ukrainians in the West.

The vicious and distasteful attacks which Moroz and his associates have launched on the Western Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group and its supporters have undoubtedly disappointed and disillusioned many human rights activists who were involved in defence campaigns on behalf of Moroz and other Ukrainian political prisoners. This may lead some groups to make a useful re-evaluation of the nature and strategy of their activities in defence of Ukrainian political prisoners. But some may become so disillusioned by these recent controversies that they may cease or scale down their defence work.

In a recent private letter written from internal exile, for example, a prominent Ukrainian dissident has noted that he no longer receives as much correspondence from abroad as he used to. He wonders whether the skepticism caused by the bizarre behavior of Moroz in the West has influenced emigre perceptions of other Ukrainian political prisoners, and warns that the case of Moroz is definitely unique, and that Moroz speaks on behalf of no-one but himself.

It would therefore be truly unfortunate if those who are involved in human rights defence work allow their activities to be negatively influenced by the erratic behavior of one or two recent arrivals in the West.

It will be interesting, for example, to see how the Ukrainian community reacts to the intensive defence campaign now being launched on behalf of Danylo Shumuk, now the "senior" Ukrainian political prisoner in the Soviet Union. A member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine in inter-war Poland, during the war Shumuk joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and was sentenced to death (later commuted to twenty-five years of imprisonment) by a Soviet military tribunal. Now 65, Shumuk has spent more than thirty-five years imprisoned in Polish and Soviet prisons and labor camps. A sincere Ukrainian patriot who has suffered greatly because of his love for his homeland, Shumuk has nonetheless harshly criticized certain extremist tendencies within the Ukrainian nationalist movement during the Second World War, and has tried to counteract similar tendencies among a (fortunately) very few present-day Ukrainian dissenters.

Shumuk's case has thus been ignored by many Ukrainian circles in the West who resent his critical and uncompromising posture. Amnesty International, on the other hand, has been very active in defence of Danylo Shumuk. The Amnesty International Group at the University of Toronto is organizing an entire week of activities early in March in defence of Soviet political prisoners, and the primary focus of these activities will be the case of Danylo Shumuk.

Will the Ukrainian community support Amnesty International in this campaign?

S.S.

# STUDENT STUDENT ETUDIANT

ГАЗЕТА УКРАЇНСЬКОГО СТУДЕНТСТВА КАНАДИ

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Student is a national monthly newspaper for Ukrainian-Canadian students, published by Kvas Publication Society, an independent collective of Ukrainian-Canadian students interested in developing their identity as Ukrainians in Canada.

Student is an open forum for fact and opinion, reflecting the interests of Ukrainian-Canadian students on various topics — social, cultural, political and religious.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in individual signed articles are the responsibility of their authors, and not necessarily those of the Student staff. Student's role is to serve as a medium through which discussion can be conducted on given issues from any point of view.

Letters to the editor are welcome. We reserve the right to edit materials for publication. Student is a member of Canadian University Press (CUP). Second Class Registration Number 4883.

STAFF: Dana Anderson, Darla Antonishka, Eileen Antonishka, Jars Balan, Myroslaw Bodnaruk, Mark Ferbey, Sharon Malchuk, Marko Lytvak, Andrii Makuch, Nestor Makuch, Joanne Melnychuk, Petar Melnychuk, Calvin Melnyk, Roman Olaski, Nestor Palitriw, Roman Petriw, Boris Radio, Dawn Shewchuk, Bohdan Suchowarsky, Bohdan Zajcew, Natalia Zymovetz, and several more who didn't have the courage to admit it.



All signed letters of reasonable length which comply with Canadian libel and slander laws will be printed unedited (save for purposes of clarity) in this column. We will not print anonymous letters, but if for personal reasons contributors wish to withhold their names or use a pseudonym, this can be arranged. In all cases, however, we require both a genuine signature and a return address.

## Prairie flowers

The University of Regina Ukrainian Students' Club, Alpha Omega, would like to announce that we are hosting the SUSK Western Conference on March 7, 8, and 9, 1980.

As well as discussing SUSK business, we will also have such topics as culture, language, prejudice, humour and folklore for discussion. We will also be holding workshops on various aspects of Ukrainian culture.

Laura Forgie  
Secretary  
Alpha Omega  
Regina, Saskatchewan

## Olympic-ticked

I found Bohdan Somchynsky's article in the last issue of Student rather confusing. If I have understood his conclusions correctly, he is proposing that organizations calling for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics reconsider their stand, since this issue has become a political football which will be manipulated to serve the interests of American foreign policy. Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument would propose that as soon as a particular government begins to manipulate a given issue to serve its own

narrow ends, organizations disagreeing with these ends, but concerned about the issue, would have to abandon any strategies coinciding with those of the given government.

Such a stand may be "principled" in a vague theoretical sense, but raises as many problems as it solves. Some of the questions raised in the article are worth debating at greater length, but I hardly think that the simplistic argument used by Somchynsky is very satisfying.

Ivan Jaworsky  
Ottawa, Ontario

## Are you guys crazy?

Your newspaper is interesting enough (therefore the donation).

However, a couple of points:

- (1) Why pick on Moroz?
- (2) Is he any crazier than the editors of Student or just about any Ukrainian whose articles you publish? If so, please explain (without getting dogmatic yourself).

Dr. med. Jerry R. Hordinsky  
Federal Republic of Germany

Enc: \$11.11 donation (you have to live in Germany to know the significance of \$11.11).

## Conference capers

Дозвольте нам, від імені студентів молоді організації СУСК у Саскатуні, повідомити вас, що ми ще живі. Ми довідалися, що організувати такий гурток треба мати досить вільного часу і сильної дисципліни. На цей місяць ми маємо досить багато праці і ми впевнені що все пройде з успіхом. А також ми хочемо побачити всім організаціям СУСК-у щасливого нового року та успіхів у новому десятилітті.

З масою найкращих побажань до вас:

Люда Маруцян  
Лесь Маруцук  
Український  
студентський клуб  
Saskatoon, Sask.

## Congrats!

Congratulations on your recent admission to Canadian University Press. I hope you continue to publish a first class paper!

Michael Pyriajansk  
Waterloo, Ontario



I think I'll send my Valentine a copy of Student!

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— If you are not a member, then you stand to miss several issues of Student this year.

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# Boycott Olympics to protest repressions

Sviatoslav Karavansky and Nina Strokata, two dissidents recently released from Soviet Ukraine [see *Student* December 1979], have come out in favour of an Olympic boycott and strongly against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.


Speaking 1 February at a press conference held in Toronto's Sheraton Hotel, the two recent exiles outlined their position linking the boycott and Afghanistan to the suppression of dissent within the Soviet Union. Karavansky emphasized that "a boycott of the Olympics should be called, not because of the invasion of Afghanistan but because of the internal repressions in the Soviet Union." He underscored, however, his firm opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, going even as far as to propose that the United States attack Cuba if the Soviet troops are not recalled.

Strokata elaborated upon the linkage of Soviet foreign policy to its internal affairs, noting that for years there have been individuals in the Soviet Union who have been pointing out "parallels in internal and external policies." Strokata recalled that in January 1977, before the first arrests of the members of the Helsinki Monitoring Groups, she was present at a meeting of the Moscow Helsinki Group. Held in Moscow at the residence of Alexander Ginzburg, the meeting was convened in response to a wave of house searches conducted by the KGB. A statement was drafted claiming that "the step up of repressive measures leads us to think that the Soviet Union is taking on some kind of military action." Sakharov, who was also present at this meeting, felt no need to make such a harsh statement and expressed concern over the possible repercussions it might have; the draft was revised, omitting the reference to military action. "I wonder if Sakharov now remembers this, when living in Gorky," said Strokata.

When queried on the attitude of the Soviet people towards increased militarism, Strokata stated that "there is a complicated two-fold attitude towards war." She emphasized that an anti-war feeling exists among the generation which vividly remembers the horrors of the Second World War, but that it "remains very private." However, as soon as Soviet propaganda is intensified, she claimed, their attitude changes, and "those same people who spoke of the horrors ... now speak of victory." Such attitudes should not be startling since, as Karavansky pointed out, the young are constantly being prepared for war by the schools.

Returning to the Olympic boycott, the dissidents claimed that the Soviet people are relatively isolated from the discussion. Karavansky stated that those who listen to foreign radio broadcasts are informed about the boycott; yet he felt that "the Soviet people will not act differently even if they know about it," stressing the power which the Soviet propaganda machine has on its citizens. "If the games don't take place," Strokata added, "the Soviet people, no matter how misinformed, will be presented with a fait accompli. They will then realize that the West is taking a different attitude towards their country, which may evoke what could prove to be a very positive response."

Karavansky also assessed the possible outcome of the forthcoming Madrid conference which would review the



Sviatoslav Karavansky

implementations of the Helsinki accords. He feels that little will be gained for the Soviet defense movement since although "the



Nina Strokata

conference is intended to expose such things as Soviet violations of human rights and unjustified invasions ... the

Soviet Union will not honour any diplomatic agreement. They will merely continue the program which has been in effect for the past sixty years." Karavansky fears that Soviet Union may not attend the conference, while Strokata anticipates that even if they did that "the Soviet Union and its traditional demagogic approach will exhaust everyone and deceive them."

Both dissidents stressed that, despite fears of subjecting prominent dissidents to repression by bringing their names to the foreground (ala Sakharov), that defense campaigns on their behalf should not be dampened. Karavansky cited the examples of Danylo Shumuk and Vasyli Romanuk, who "because of their long-term im-

prisonments and harsh conditions ... should be placed in the first ranks of those defended." Strokata quickly added that in addition to prominent figures "we must not forget about the other political prisoners, whose numbers are always increasing."

As individuals, both Strokata and Karavansky are eager to listen to and discuss a wide range of issues. They seek information about Ukrainian life in the West, and are interested in past, present and future student activities. Ukrainian student clubs across Canada should offer them the opportunity to participate in formal and/or informal discussion sessions. Such an exchange of ideas could only prove healthy for them and we students.

## Australian experience instructive

# Where multiculturalism is really 'down under'

Ivan Jaworsky

Australia, which used to have a reputation as the most Anglo-Saxon dominion in the British Commonwealth, has in the last few years begun to adopt much of the multicultural rhetoric we take for granted in Canada, as one can see from the titles of a few recent Australian publications: *Ethnic Rights, Power and Participation: Toward a Multicultural Australia; Australia 2000: The Ethnic Impact; Australia as a Multicultural Society*.

It so happens that since the Second World War Australia has received a higher proportion of immigrants than almost any other country in the world, and approximately one-quarter of its population is now made up of non-British immigrants and their children. But is Australia in fact any more a "multicultural" country than Canada? How does the situation there differ from that in Canada?

There is a tremendous amount of diversity both within and among the non-Anglo-Saxon and non-French ethnic groups in Canada, and one of the greatest problems the Canadian federal government's multiculturalism policy has faced is trying to cater to the wide range of interests found among these disparate groups. It is difficult enough getting several of our myriad Ukrainian organizations in Canada to coordinate any of their activities; just imagine trying to get much cooperation among representatives of ethnic groups which, at least at first glance, appear to have very little in common.

The situation is somewhat simpler in Australia. Although a wide range of ethnic groups is also found there, the vast majority of the members of non-British ethnic groups came to Australia after the Second World War, or are their children. In addition, although Australia accepted a considerable number of east European refugees (including Ukrainians) soon after the war, the overwhelming majority of recent immigrants has come from southern Europe; the three largest non-British ethnic groups in the country today are the Italians, Greeks, and Yugoslavia (Croats and Serbs). These large groups are of similar cultural backgrounds, and have shared many of the same problems and experiences in adapting to Australian society.

Until recently the non-British ethnic groups in Australia kept to themselves and were fairly passive. The host society assumed that they would be quickly assimilated, and it was only during the sixties that the increasing proportion of non-British immigrants in the inner-city cores of major urban centers such as Melbourne, Victoria and Sydney drew much public attention. Even then, attitudes were often patronizing. Immigrants and their children were usually simply treated as "problems", school and welfare officials felt that if a little more attention was devoted to some of their more pressing needs, it would only be a matter of time before they became "model" Australians.


The climate for cultural pluralism in Australia changed considerably in the early seventies. The 1972 election was the first election, for example, in which a political party (Labor) attempted to genuinely appeal to minority ethnic groups. The Labor government which took office in 1972 was committed to a sweeping program of social change, and the first Minister of Immigration in the new cabinet, Al Grassby, became a strong advocate of "multiculturalism" in Australia.

organizations which have arisen in several states to express the viewpoints and aspirations of ethnic minorities, and which in some cases have become efficient lobby groups for ethnic interests. Ethnic activists from the Greek and Italian communities have also become more aggressive within the Australian trade union movement, and have tried to modify the hostile attitude of most trade unionists of British background toward immigrants.

The experience of minority ethnic groups in Australia has therefore differed considerably from that in Canada, where the most active promoters of multiculturalism have been Ukrainian Canadians and other representatives of the "established" ethnic groups who can sometimes trace their immigrant forefathers back three or four generations. Their concerns are often quite different from those of more recent immigrants, especially the "visible minorities," and the lack of a dialogue between these two sectors of the "ethnic" community has strongly hindered attempts to create an ethnic "lobby" and to exert any effective pressure on Canadian federal or provincial governments.

providing a clear framework for a "multiculturalism" policy, and realistically defining the scope and limits of "multiculturalism". But although this concept still represents a somewhat abstract ideal, the prospects for government recognition of ethnocultural pluralism in Australia are no worse than in Canada. The extent to which immigrant societies such as Canada and Australia recognize ethnic minorities depends a great deal on how they mobilize their political resources, and it seems that the non-British ethnic groups in Australia, which have shared many common experiences as post-Second World War immigrants to Australia, have been able to cooperate much more effectively than minority ethnic groups in Canada in presenting cohesive demands to the government. Much will depend on whether they can continue to press their demands on the government in a coordinated fashion.

Likewise, although there is much to complain about in Canada as far as the government's recognition of minority ethnic groups is concerned, one should avoid relying primarily on the "good will" of the government to correct this situation. These



The non-British ethnic groups have themselves become more active in the political process. Many ethnic group representatives, especially from the younger generation, have rejected the paternalistic approach of many Australian institutions, and have begun to insist on ethnic rights, dignity and pluralism as a positive, creative force. Much of their attention has been focussed on Ethnic Communities Councils, independent

Numerous problems face the multiculturalism movement in Australia. Many Anglo-Australians are willing to accept only superficial aspects of ethnocultural pluralism, and there are strong racist tendencies in some sectors of Australian society. In addition, although the word "multiculturalism" and the concept of ethnocultural pluralism have become increasingly popular in Australia, there has been a great deal of difficulty in

groups should also begin to pay more attention to the coordination of their political resources, and become more aggressive in their approach to government: if the Canadian multiculturalism policy is to become much more than a symbolic acknowledgement of Canada's ethnic diversity. This is where the Australian experience may perhaps be most instructive.

# Taras Chornowol: towards

Taras Chornowol is an artist of exceptional and diverse talents. This foremost Canadian jazz violinist has performed with such greats as Zoot Sims, Moe Kaufman and Don Francks, to name a few. Taras is also a late-budding visual artist whose intensity and instinctive approach to this medium are indeed remarkable. In the wake of a highly acclaimed showing of his works at the Scorpio Gallery in Toronto, Taras has brought his show to the Rice Gallery at the Citadel in Edmonton.

Taras was born in Edmonton, 1954, to a family with a long tradition of producing performing artists.

*"There was so much music happening around the house with Adrian playing the piano and my father playing the violin constantly, that as a little tad of probably five or six, I wanted to get in on some of the action. So the first thing they did was buy me one of those plastic, cheap violins which I immediately destroyed because of its horrible tone."*

In this inspiring milieu, warmly referred to by Taras as a "monkey see, monkey do", the "artist to be" began the search for his creative self. For eight years he took violin lessons from a very caring instructor, Sergei Eremenko, but as circumstances would always seem to have it for the very sensitive, Taras got more than his share of mock and ridicule for his affair with this "effeminate" instrument. Taras remembers going through alleys trying to hide his violin, holding it alongside his leg so his friends couldn't see it. The "street" saw the violin as very "pansy". "Christ, even today I get people laying trips on me because I play the violin."

But eight years of rebellious "shot-gun marriage" with the violin finally blossomed into quite a romance, despite a swearing to vengeance and divorce "when I [Taras] grow up." For some reason, at age 16, Taras turned around and began taking it very seriously.

*"I was getting affected by the proficiency of the people around me in the Edmonton Youth Orchestra. When you work with somebody who's a little or a lot above you, you've got something that pulls you up. . . you want to be at that level. Also I finally realized that I could express myself more honestly through my instrument, than I could verbally. In a way I'm sort of a Steppenwolf in which I like to be alone a lot, therefore it was probably a personality trait, and it hit me that I could actually speak what I felt on the instrument. Listening to other violinists, dumfounded me with what could be done, so what had been half an hour of practice a week was suddenly four to eight hours of practice a day. Actually, probably because I was not so emotionally involved with the instrument before, I did very well at all the Music Festivals, and every year I went there I think I took away first prize, that is until I really got interested in it. . . and today when I meet musicians who do it more as a hobby and a pleasure, I almost envy them because they don't get that involved, they're more relaxed, there's no big deal. . . and that's actually how it should be especially with a cat that's performing. What's happened, is it has become so hyper competition-wise, people taking it so seriously, that a lot of artists have gone down the tube. Because of the kind of life that it is, you're never certain whether you're going to be working."*

Taras began performing frequently, and making television appearances with a violin quartet which, under the mastery guidance of Taras's new violin teacher Rnald Shean, "world-premiered" Violet Archer's quartet for four violins.

*"I was a street urchin. I loved to fool around in the streets. My mind was into climbing trees and falling out of the sky, but finally I got all that together and did the prerequisites for my grade 10 violin, piano, and harmony."*

He toured Europe with the Edmonton Youth Orchestra, acting as assistant concert master and later as concert master. His natural curiosity then led him into something else altogether. . . the world of jazz. His brother, Adrian, had left home early as an accomplished classical pianist, and had become one of Canada's most fascinating jazz pianists. It was only a matter of time before Taras delved into it as well.

*"I was so engrossed in practicing 8 to 10 hours a day, that I didn't see the light of day. All I wanted to know was classical. Then I started listening to different music. I realized how much I was missing, how one-sided I had become. . . then whammo, I heard Stephane Grappelli."*

The incident that really hooked Taras to jazz was actually his first effort at public improvisation.

*"A band was taking a break at 'The Hovel' [A now defunct music club in Edmonton, and we decided to play just amidst the audience, in the aisles, and we started playing, and people started getting on it. Suddenly we got shoved right up onto stage, so we're playing away and suddenly the band comes up and joins us and the place is rocking, and everybody's having a great time. Ever since then, I think I've been hooked to jazz and its audience response. I had not had that kind of an experience with audiences classically. . . Oh, it's fine, and they clap, but who gets up in the middle of the 'Bruch Concerto' and boogies in the middle of the floor? Which usually helps one play a lot better, loosens you up. Once you get out there, you swing!"*

Taras then signed up for a jazz program at a local college and began doing scales, modes and changes, learning a little more about what he was getting into. During this time Taras and some of his teachers played in a band called "The Next Day's Hill" which performed all over Edmonton.

*"We started a late-night jazz program at the Hovel which began at 1:00 a.m., for anybody to come down and sit in and play. It was a pretty loose format, which was fantastic. Some of the best sessions that ever happened anywhere were the late night sessions because they were loose; you could say what you couldn't say during the day. It caught on like wildfire. Within a couple of weeks we actually had packed houses for 'Late Night'. We'd play from 1:00 a.m. 'til 7 or 8 in the morning when we'd go for breakfast. It was a nice way to meet a lot of people. These were probably some of the nicest times that I spent. Soon this caught on and so did the business aspect of it, and they decided to organize it all."*

Taras then left for New York. "Late Night Jazz" fell apart shortly after.

*"Hell, this is Edmonton, Alberta. When you don't have that big a demand for jazz and you start organizing it and charging big bucks at the door and all that. . . I think there could be a better way of doing it. Right now I don't have the answer, although I would if I had a place to do it myself. It's something I've always wanted to do too. . . just have a place for people to play."*

Taras went to New York to study at Carl Berger's "Creative Music Studio" with names like Anthony Braxton and Jack DeJohnette. He stayed there for only a couple of months, finding it much too free-form for his liking.

*"I wanted to be a lot more familiar with the roots of improvised music. I guess I was looking a bit more for melody at the time. So I hung out more in the city than at the school, just going to the nightclubs, listening to people like McCoy Tyner and Roland Kirk. That really taught me a lot more."*

From New York Taras went to Toronto where it was intimated by some local musicians that it was hard enough for them to get any work around town even without any outsiders, so he left and came back to Edmonton and "the classical scene." Taras then bumped into Dale Hillary of "Lighthouse" who at this time was looking for "a different sound". Taras did a concert with him and then played for a while in the violin rock band "King-Kong". Hillary then invited Taras to come to Toronto to put together a band and open up a club. As Taras had already been planning to go back to legit playing at the University of Toronto, so he went. Hillary introduced Taras to Don Francks, and together they put together not only a show, but a club.

*"It was a fantastic experience. This was my intro to the business end of music. While this was alive, it gave us an opportunity to realize at least partially a dream that all of us had, which was to have a place that could play not only jazz but all kinds of music. For example, we would play Vivaldi, and Don Francks would sing some blues on top of it. It was so fascinating, that we had from 60 year old couples, to teenager punks sitting in the audience, getting off and having a good time. The club was called 'A Nice Place' and it really was."*

While the club was in existence, Taras did a lot of contract work around Toronto, such as the C.B.C.'s Don McLean Show, Canada after Dark, and Paul Williams at the Royal York (for several weeks). He did back-up work on albums for people like Gordon Lightfoot, Ringo Starr, and Anne Murray, along with commercials and jingles with other violinists like Steven Staryk and David Zaeffer.

*"What basically kept me alive and kept me going was the studio scene. Then Adrian dropped by on his way from the Manhattan School of Music and stayed for a few months. We formed a trio, along with Don Francks, which was one of the most exciting things that I've done. I never really had a chance to work with Adrian very much until then, and it got off."*

Adrian then left for Edmonton and Taras ran into Hillary again. "Lighthouse" was re-forming so Taras joined the band and went on tour, doing arranging for them along the way. Reviewers referred to Taras as "a joy on the electric violin, imparting an intelligence 'Lighthouse' never had previously."

Now back in Edmonton, Taras and Adrian are playing together again, having just finished a C.B.C. Jazz Radio Canada program. As the Edmonton Journal announced in a recent review, "Chornowol's fiddle is fired up with impressive technique and finesse across the board, whether on Ponty fusion or Grappelli Hot Club Swing, the man has a light touch and an intelligent grasp of his instrument. Chornowol is back in town and we'll all be better for it."

But one of the main reasons Taras returned to Edmonton was to bring his art show to the city. Having just displayed his works around Toronto, where he also made several television appearances, Taras returned home with the fruits of several years of creative labor. Basically self-taught, it has only been in the last little while that he has been trying to have the visual aspect of his artistic nature recognized.

*"My work is quite different than what the people encourage here. It's away from big skys and elevator scenes. This doesn't mean I don't like nature. I love it. It's one of my greatest inspirations, but so is my imagination. I would call my work a mixture of 'reeter realism' and 'potent surrealism'. I think my work is greatly influenced by my performing and by people. To me, one of the most exciting things is to be able to capture a state of being, an essence of the person, or maybe what he's gone through, the primal and basic emotions, instincts that are inherent in people. The language of words often screws up. It's like taking what you want to say from your heart and dropping it into a bowl as ingredients, and usually unless you're a very good cook, you're going to get something that taste bad."*

Sometimes Taras won't touch the canvas for months, but then he will sit down and work eight hours a day.

*"When I sit down to paint, I work at it very slowly. Every part of that painting has got to mean something, to make sense to me. I may have worked on it for days, but I'll erase it and*



Fantastychna  
Symfonia

# total creativity

Michael Savaryn



Stepping Stones

know. What drags me down is a closed mind, it would be nice for people to open up their imaginations a little. If that were to happen, a lot of artists who see beyond "prairie scenes" would be more acceptable, and wouldn't have to drive trucks. Is there a solution? Not when you're dealing with business. I don't think you can re-educate the public either. The artist is often ahead of his time. The people who set the pace were always put down. Maybe it's a prerequisite to making it as an artist, that once you die, maybe you'll make some money."

As Taras grew up in a very Ukrainian environment, it seemed logical to ask him about its influence on his art.

"I'm not a nationalist. I'm Ukrainian though. Ukrainian is my native tongue. Berlioz called his work 'Symphonie Fantastique', I called mine 'Fantasychna Symfonia'. It rounds me out more. It gives me another way of looking at life. It gives me another facet, like a fly that has a million faceted eyes. I'd love to be able to communicate with everybody. That's why music is such a nice thing. Some of my compositions have been affected a little by that ethnic sound. It's there somewhere and maybe it will make its realization in some things that I do. But I think I keep away from that stuff in that it has become such a nationalistic thing and that's all. I want to use it for its total creative purposes and for nothing nationalistic or political. And that's probably why I kept away from it because it was always pounded into us to do such heavy Ukrainians, and to show it in everything that we did. I think it should just be an enhancement of the way you lead your life. It should be a positive thing, not something you should stand up against something else with. So when I do use it, it will be in a totally creative sense. Maybe that's what I have to get out of my system first, just thinking of it as a purely nationalistic thing. It would probably come to me a lot sooner if I had a possibility of going there, going to Ukraine, and living with the people. I mean ethnically, and earning from them. *Shche ne vmerla Ukraina ni slava ni volia...* what else can you say. Lets hope that it's free some day. Let's hope that every country's free, someday. I fight for it in my heart. Let's hope that everyone can live together someday."

On that note of brotherly love, we left Taras with his work and our best wishes.

Stefan Semykivsky

feel better that I've got exactly what I want. It takes a lot of work, and it usually totals me. I'll go out into the street, green from lack of sunshina and fresh air, but I'll feel I'm getting closer to producing something. I want to be able to put down on canvas something that's going to affect people for years. Miles Davis once said: "If I can blow one good line of jazz a night, something that makes sense, and something that's new, then it's all worth it". For something to have meaning, you have to put a lot of work into it. I'm not against anything avant-garde, if it can say something, if it can move me. People like hearing and seeing things they can relate to, things they've heard and seen a million times before. That's all they

## Will Multiculturalism suffer?

# Post-election bureaucracide

Many civil servants in Ottawa breathed a sigh of relief on 18 February when the Liberals returned to power in Ottawa. For many inhabitants of that enlightened center of officialdom the brief period when the Conservatives held office simply represented a tiny ripple in the unbroken stream of the Liberal dynasty in Ottawa, and should be forgotten as soon as possible. Many civil servants are eagerly looking forward to returning to the halcyon days when their word was law in Ottawa, and Trudeau and his "superbureaucrat" associates tinkered with all the latest buzzwords in modern management theory (PPBS, MBO, etc.) to create a technocrat's paradise on the banks of the mighty Ottawa River.

Actually, one shouldn't be too cynical, for there were some fairly novel developments in some branches of the civil service during the early seventies. For example, a team of dynamic "guerilla" bureaucrats such as Bernard Ostry were let loose on the Secretary of State Department to "shake up" this rather staid and slow-moving unit. The buzzword was "participation," and considerable money was spent to set up a women's bureau, OFY (Opportunities for Youth) and human rights programs, and to expand travel, exchange, and hostel programs. This was also the period when the multicultural policy was announced in an

effort to prevent the "other" ethnic groups from feeling alienated in the wake of the announcement of official bilingualism.

However, although these new initiatives helped to sensitize the public to many important and neglected problems in Canadian society, little thought was given to the long-term implications and stability of the programs set up to implement these initiatives. After the euphoria of the early seventies passed by, the activities of the multiculturalism program, for example, became increasingly liable to partisan political manipulation. In addition, the status of the relatively small Multiculturalism Directorate within the Secretary of State Department, and the responsibilities of the Minister of State for Multiculturalism, were never clearly defined. As time went on the senior bureaucracy of the Secretary of State Department became increasingly entrenched and inflexible, and many important initiatives proposed by the Multiculturalism Directorate or the Minister of State for Multiculturalism were almost inevitably stymied by senior bureaucrats in this department. Unfortunately, much of the resistance to these initiatives came from senior civil servants of French-Canadian background, who on the whole have shown little interest, and occasionally even hostility to,

the concept of multiculturalism.

It is difficult to gauge the sincerity of the short-lived Conservative government with respect to multiculturalism; there are some indications that the Conservatives were just as willing to manipulate the policy for short-term partisan gain as were the Liberals. However, the Conservatives did make a commitment to raise the status and profile of the multiculturalism program within the Secretary of State Department, and there was some potential for modest successes in this area. Certainly the Conservatives were less reluctant than the Liberals to interfere in the internal processes of the senior bureaucracy, and to propose some fairly drastic reorganizations.

With the return of the Liberals, however, bureaucratic inertia will probably again rear its head in the Secretary of State Department. The Multiculturalism Directorate will likely remain a small and rather insignificant unit, with little autonomy, within this massive sector of the civil service, its initiatives will continue to be frustrated by senior bureaucrats in the department, and the Minister of State for Multiculturalism will remain a figurehead.

Unfortunately, it seems that although it was a Liberal government which first announced the multiculturalism policy, it may very well be a Liberal government which also presides over its demise.



In this day and age of fads, fashions and overnight sensations, it's indeed comforting to learn that some things never change. The latest issue of *Socialist Voice* — get one now as it is sure to become a collector's item — reveals that at least local Trotskyists are remaining true to the heritage of their late but great guru. In a front page editorial, reinforced by a background article inside, the voice of the vanguard explains in great detail the party line on the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan for the benefit of the faithful and the Canadian proletariat alike. Essentially, the articles advance the argument that revolutionaries must give their admittedly qualified support to the Soviet "intervention," because despite all of its faults (attributable to Stalin, of course), the Soviet Union will still ultimately exert a positive and progressive influence in that semi-barbaric part of the world. They will, for instance, guarantee religious freedom and make sure that the rights of ethnic minorities get recognition and respect. They will also ensure, by their military presence, that the agents of American imperialism do not meddle in the affairs of the region.

Claiming that the social revolution launched by the previous pro-Soviet regime was well-intentioned but rather heavy-handed in its approach — provoking mass desertions from the army and armed resistance from the reactionary peasantry in whose interests it was being advanced — the *Voice* argues that it was necessary to bring in Soviet troops because the entire venture was in danger of collapse. Presumably that is also why it was necessary to eliminate all of the incompetents associated with the old leadership and to bring in thousands of expert bureaucrats from the Soviet Union.

If it all sounds vaguely familiar — the contempt for the peasantry, the references to the imminent threat of counter-revolution, and the underlying justification of revolution imported from outside and imposed from above — that's because exactly the same arguments were used by the Bolsheviks to crush opposition to their dictatorship in Ukraine, at Kronstadt, and elsewhere. So the *Socialist Voice* is commendably following in the footsteps of their revolutionary ancestors.

But why dredge up ancient history?

Just ask any Ukrainian Trotskyist for the correct explanation as to why it is necessary to support the big brotherly actions of the Soviets in Afghanistan. Although it might be difficult to find one these days, the cartwheels of logic they will undoubtedly perform are sure to make the effort worthwhile entertainment.

• Although our favourite Rhino did not make it to Ottawa, Volodymyr Koskoych is hardly dismayed. "We outpolled the Socreds in Calgary," he said, "and stomped the shit out of the Marxist-Leninists and Communist Party hacks everywhere." (Status, after all, is relative). Vlodko figures his chances of sneaking in between the pillars of power are not over yet. "The Senate! The Senate!" he bellowed, "I mean they are all closet Rhinos in the Senate. After that I'm a shoe-in for a Cabinet post — I mean, my friends need jobs too!" Although Rhino pollsters in Edmonton had placed their party far ahead of even the Lateralists and the Regressive-Preservatives, Koskoych was not disillusioned by the final results, quipping philosophically that "Ukrainians never trusted polls anyway."

• Many Ukrainian Canadians were disappointed to hear that John George Diefenbaker was not re-elected in his Prince Albert riding. Furthermore, they were surprised to find out that he was not even running. And they were positively shocked when they discovered that he had not even been nominated. When they found he was dead, they were speechless. Many were still awaiting the punchline to his immortal U.N. statement, "And what about the freedom-loving Ukrainians?"

• Attention members of the Ukrainian Insurrectionist Army! Comrade Makhno's account of his meeting with Lenin in the Kremlin in 1918 is now available for the first time to the English reading masses. Published under the title *My Visit to the Kremlin*, this chapter from our Bat'ko's autobiography has been translated and issued in pamphlet form and can be obtained (for mere kopeks and the cost of postage) through the Black Cat Press, at P.O. Box 11261, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, T5J 2T6. Other pamphlets that have been put out by this press include *Comrade Makhno's Syndicalists in the Russian Revolution*; *Poland 1976: State Capitalism in Crisis*; and the Max Nomad classic *Masters Old and New*. In the works are several new titles, among them a rare description of the Kronstadt uprising by Anton Ciliga. Also of interest to Nabat members is the news that the French edition of our Bat'ko's autobiography was recently re-issued with a preface by Daniel Guerin. Clearly, word about our movement is spreading — can anarchy be far off?

• You learn something new everyday, so they say. And Sunday 17 February Toronto students were privileged to learn that they are not only infiltrated but overwhelmingly "ravaged" by — you guessed it — our old friend, the original red herring with the bushy eyebrows, sssshhhhh ... furtive glance left and right ... hushed tones ... m.a.r.x.i.s.m. ... It seems at a meeting of Toronto's youth with Nina Strokata and Sviatoslav Karavansky, organized jointly by Toronto's youth organizations (SUM, Plast, ODUM, SUMK and the U of T USC), Karavansky let the cat out of the bag by informing the group that en route to the meeting he had been briefed on that all-pervasive crimson spectre looming over Toronto's cadres of youth. The source of information was none other than one of the meeting's organizers and chauter-for-a-day, M. Muzyczka, who also moonlights as *holovnyi vyshovnyk* for the national office of SUM. Interestingly enough Muzyczka was not about to produce even one SUMIVETZ, or -ka to represent his organization at the meeting; perhaps this was his rationale for taking a seat on the front panel reserved for the Karavansky and the presiding chairperson. The meeting was attended by about 30 of Toronto's youth, and the most visible shades of red present were in the eyeballs of club members — the consequence of wild indulgence during the previous day's evening-to-dawn celebration of the end of U of T's Ukrainian Week.

# Mediascope



## The CRTC and Edmonton ethnic radio

The Canadian Radio Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) regularly travels between Canadian cities to hear out issues as they pertain to the broadcasting industry. It moves into Edmonton in early March to entertain applications for the licensing of an AM band (1480 on the dial), multilingual radio station to serve Edmonton and outlying regions.

No doubt there is a need for a media outlet of this nature. And given the ethnic demographics of Edmonton, the size of the city's Ukrainian population will surely warrant a good deal of air time devoted to Ukrainian language programming. This month's *Mediascope* takes a look at the two proposals for "ethnic radio" in Edmonton, and poses some questions Ukrainians should be prepared to ask both applicants if their needs and desires are to be fulfilled.

The first application is being tendered by well-known Edmonton broadcaster Roger Charest, former owner of stations in Fort McMurray, Westlock, and St. Paul, Alberta. Charest previously applied for the licensing of an FM multilingual radio station in December 1978. At the time the CRTC saw fit to deny the application. Charest now proposes the establishment of a 10,000 watt operation that would initially broadcast approximately 19 hours daily.

The second contender is one Ernest Mykyte, currently the president-manager of radio station CJJC-AM in Langley, British Columbia. Mykyte will present the CRTC with a proposal which would allow for the creation of a 50,000 watt outlet that would operate 24 hours a day.

Employment-wise, the Charest application would support a full-time staff of 15, to be assisted by the Ethnic Activities Reporting System (EARS) — a network of ethnic stringers and correspondents that supposedly has been in training since June 1979. By contrast, the Mykyte proposal would provide for a full-time staff of 24, along with 20 part-time tree-lance workers.

To date, both applicants have refrained from releasing exact details on proposed Ukrainian programming. Charest has promised that 8 percent of his weekly broadcast time would be allocated to Ukrainians. That means approximately 10.8 hours of Ukrainian programming weekly, or 1.54 hours daily. Mykyte's proposal would devote 4.8 percent of weekly broadcast time to Ukrainians. A percentage breakdown shows this would allow for 8.06 hours of Ukrainian language programming weekly, or 1.15 hours daily. What time slots these programs would occupy has not been revealed by either Charest or Mykyte.

Neither of the applicants has deemed necessary to announce details of the proposed structure and content of their Ukrainian broadcasts. Charest has been consulting extensively with certain community activists and with Edmonton radio producer Roman Onufrijchuk, former premiere Ukrainian broadcaster in Winnipeg and a motive force behind the creation of innovative and entertaining Ukrainian radio programming in that city. A good choice and a good start, to say the least.

The Mykyte camp, on the other hand, is keeping a very low profile. *Mediascope* has learned, however, that Mykyte has secured the services of veteran Ukrainian broadcaster Dan Chomiak as both a shareholder and station manager for his proposed multilingual operation. It sounds ominous already. We can only hope that Chomiak would be kept as far away from influencing Ukrainian programming structure and content as possible. Where that man reads, cacophony follows.

Both Charest and Mykyte have been tight-lipped about the possibility of educational Ukrainian broadcasts. While the latter won't be commercial money-makers, they are desperately needed by the Ukrainian community and could be financially subsidized via other channels. Neither of the prospective candidates has expounded on the feasibility of bilingual Ukrainian/English programming. Broadcasts of this nature may be a necessity if non-Ukrainian speaking elements of the community and non-Ukrainians are not to be alienated.

Little is known about how either applicant intends to gain the support of Ukrainian advertisers for their proposed Ukrainian programs. This promises to be one of the most critical issues. One need only consider Winnipeg's multilingual radio operation CKJS and its perpetual problem of securing Ukrainian advertisers to realize that a similar obstacle could present itself in Edmonton.

Of the two applications, the Charest proposal appears the most solid and realistic. Charest is prepared to swallow an operational deficit for the first two years, while Mykyte is predicting profits in his first year of operation. And that always spells danger: approach with caution. Quality could be sacrificed for the almighty dollar. This writer is prepared to throw full support behind the Charest application, providing that the questions raised above are answered with satisfaction.

The bottom line is community involvement. It should be remembered that whichever application is approved, the resulting multilingual station will be there to serve the community. But by the same token, if the venture is to succeed, the community of prospective listeners will have to make a tremendous input. Then let's ask ourselves: are we ready to do that? Or do we really care?

Past practice has shown that when listeners regard a Ukrainian program on a multilingual station as standard, they themselves are at least as much to blame as are the station's owners and program producers. How many of us are writing letters to the CRTC indicating that we support the concept of multilingual radio? Are our illustrious Ukrainian organizations sending letters of support? Multiculturalism is damned — the validity of this broadcasting concept is still in doubt! Are we suggesting ideas we would like to see incorporated into Ukrainian programming? Are

# BOOK REVIEWS

## Книжки для дітей

Лада Горняткєвич



ЗАЙЧИК НАТАЛЬЧИК

БОГДАНА ГОРИХ—ИМОЦЬ



ГОСТІ

БОГДАНА ГОРИХ—ИМОЦЬ



МУШКА МОТРУШКА

БОГДАНА ГОРИХ—ИМОЦЬ

Bohdanna Horich-Cmos. Zaichyk Natalchyk; Mushka Motrushka; Hosti. Toronto: Sadochok, 1979. \$3.75 each or \$10.00 per set of three.

### Зайчик Натальчик

Я думала, що книжка Зайчик Натальчик є повчальна. В цій книжці Зайчик побачив, що надвірні сніг падає. Він так хотів піти бавитися, що аж забув надягнути плащ. Як він скінчив бавитися, він прийшов додому і тримався за горло. Як мама побачила, що Зайчик тримається за горло, вона йому поставила термометр у рот. Мама послала його до ліжка і на столі коло ліжка поставила пляшку гіркої аспірини.

Книжка вчить дітей, щоб ніколи не забувати носити плащ, як ідути надвір, коли холодно.

### Гості

Ця книжка про гостей, що приходять вночі і розкидають все. Тоді мама рано приходить і сварить дівчину. Ця книжка така, як решта книжок, що в прочитала, тільки тут я не розуміла, чи дівчина розкидала по кімнаті, чи це дійсно зробили гості!

Ці книжки легкі, короткі і навчальні. Вони добрі, щоб читати в садочку.

Лада Горняткєвич має дев'ять років і вчиться в українсько-англійській двомаївній четвертій класі школи с. Мартина в Едмонтоні.

### Мушка Мотрушка

Я думала, що книжка Мушка Мотрушка найліпша для неслухняних дітей. Книжка є про Мушку, що була непослушна, лікарів не слухала та впадала в сноп.

Вона вчить дітей слухатися батьків, учителів і т.д. Найліпше, що книжка дає дитині нагоду навчитися читати.

# A terror of an alternative

Christine Burdeniuk

Frederick Forsyth. *The Devil's Alternative*. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1979. 479 pp. \$14.95.

Reader resonance to the book *The Devil's Alternative* is likely to be one of anger: anger with the fact that Forsyth so badly uses character stereotypes, cliché plots and situations. The cliché and the stereotype are useful literary techniques, but not as substitutes for character development. Neither Adam Munro, the British diplomat/agent, nor Andrew Drake (Andrii Drach) the Ukrainian nationalist-terrorist, nor any of the American or Soviet "big shots" so liberally spread throughout the book can qualify as fully-rounded personalities.

This factor is particularly important in considering the role of Andrii Drach. While his strategical genius can

somehow be admired, even at face value, his motivation for implementing this genius is not clear. Firstly, Forsyth uses an absolute minimum amount of narration in trying to establish Drach's nationalistic sentiments and consequent terrorist behaviour. Relying heavily on a few pat Ukrainian phrases and the notion of brotherhood among countrymen, the author expects the reader to accept Drach's extremist tactics as legitimately motivated actions. The result is not what Forsyth likely intended, i.e. merely a comment on terrorist activity, but a severe blow to the Ukrainian community.

Forsyth's terrorist seeks to hold the world at bay to serve

his own "narrow" provincial cause. What ensues is massive political scrambling to keep the factionalized Soviet Politburo in the hands of "rational" men in the effort to stave off war, and a horrendous environmental threat to most of the northern European nations. Thus, the real result of this behaviour is the portrayal of the Soviet regime, and the world, as victims of reactionaries. Even the chairman of the K.G.B. can exude more sympathy out of the reader than the small band of Ukrainian nationalists. The Ukrainian cause is portrayed as little more than violent behaviour that jeopardizes much more than it could ever hope to remedy.

Throughout the rest of the book Forsyth seeks to ameliorate the blows he has administered to the reader's sensibilities. But the damage is done and his band-aid techniques only cause further irritation. The fact that Drach in the end really does not kill anyone, that the Politburo remains intact and "committed" to peace, that the Americans pull off another international political coup, and that the British remain ever the essential middlemen are conclusions that the reader can do without. There are points of interest, even of intrigue, but the book is anti-climatic from page one (let alone when Drach is engulfed in flames of burning oil, screaming "Sheche ne vmerla Ukraina.")

At best *The Devil's Alternative* lacks sophistication; at worst, it is an attempt to persuade Harlequin Romance groups that "political" fiction contains the same genre of plot and character development as their literary pabulum does. More regrettable, though, is the book's slighting of the Ukrainian people; for the actions of the few are always attributed to the many.

we willing to familiarize ourselves with the two proposals for multilingual radio in Edmonton to the extent that we are able to add a knowledgeable vote of support to our preferred choice? Will the rumoured-to-be-existing Ukrainian Professional and Business Club media action committee have a brief prepared for the upcoming CRTC hearings, or will it lie dormant for the usual five years until it finally gets its act together? Are Ukrainian businessmen at long last going to realize that their businesses only stand to gain if they advertise on the Ukrainian programs, and that the programs' very survival depends on their coming up with advertising dollars? Are the listeners prepared to write letters of support once the Ukrainian programs go to air? Winnipeg's Ukrainian community proved itself incapable of any of the above, resulting in the chaotic condition of Ukrainian programming on that city's multilingual station. And it could very well happen in Edmonton.

Ukrainians will have the final say in whether they will be deluged with tacky polka music and bastardized Ukrainian, or whether they will receive quality Ukrainian programming. God knows we could use the latter, and have the potential resources in our community to come up with it. And if we get the former, it's only because we deserve it, our hands having found their usual resting place beneath our backseats.

The CRTC hearings will be held at the Edmonton Plaza Hotel on March 5, 6, and 7, and Edmonton's Ukrainian community should not be left without a voice in these proceedings. Let's see if for once we can do away with the notorious Ukrainian tendency for inaction. It is to be hoped that there indeed are action groups who are planning on submitting briefs at these hearings which will express opinions and ideas as to what type of Ukrainian programming the community desires and is willing to actively support. Only then can the Ukrainian Edmontonians be assured that their best interests will be given fair representation, and that the new multilingual radio station will supply the community with a quality service it so desperately needs.

# Relentless attack on Helsinki Group escalates

An inquisition has been launched against those individuals among Ukrainians abroad who are doing more than anyone else to defend Soviet Ukrainian political prisoners.

General Petro Hryhorenko and the Western Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group have once again been put on "trial", this time in the West. In what has been aptly termed a "Kangaroo Court" (*Kanadilskyi Farmer*, 11 February 1980), Hryhorenko and his Group have been accused by Valenty Moroz and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-revolutionaries (OUN-b) of nothing short of "treason." Although Hryhorenko has been subjected to periodic denunciations ever since his ill-received remarks about fascism at the Third World Congress of Free Ukrainians, the campaign has recently been escalated.

At the 15 December 1979 meeting of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) National Council, the UCCA withdrew its support of Hryhorenko and the Western Representation. The full text of this resolution, proposed by OUN-b activist Ihnat Bilinsky, is as follows:

*Following a discussion on the announcement in the Ukrainian press about General Hryhorenko's statements, saying that he joined the editorial board of the Russian journal Kontinent in which General Hryhorenko stated that the USSR is not a Russian colonial empire and that Russian imperialism does not exist as an enemy of the Ukrainian people and other captive nations, and also that Moscow is not conducting a policy of Russification and is not enslaving Ukraine, the UCCA National Council feels that this political concept of General Hryhorenko is false and detrimental to Ukrainian liberation efforts, and will not support the activity of the Western Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, which he heads. (Svoboda, 17 January 1980)*

This resolution, while clothed in rhetoric allegedly defending the Ukrainian cause, is little more than a thinly-veiled attempt by its backers to promote purely partisan interests. It is based on a series of statements by Hryhorenko which were either misread or deliberately taken completely out of context to portray him as a raving Russophile — a characterization which even a cursory perusal of any of his writings would dismiss. In addition, the circumstances under which the resolution was passed were peculiar: the resolution was unexpectedly tacked onto the agenda at the 15 December meeting (and not submitted beforehand), and with the result that the majority of those present were not able to familiarize themselves with Hryhorenko's article in question before voting on it. Requests to either read the article aloud at the meeting or to delay the resolution until the participants would read it themselves were arbitrarily rejected by the chair, without a vote being taken.

Needless to say, the *Banderite* press has picked up on this "expose" and is busily flogging it to death (for example see "Natsionelny: interes i oporuzhennia," *Homin Ukrainy* 6 February 1980; and "A blueprint for disaster?" *Ukrainian Echo* 9 January 1980). Interestingly enough, the remainder of the Ukrainian press is virtually unmythomous in its support for Hryhorenko. Many had printed the "controversial" article, "On the question of state in-

dependence and relations between peoples of the USSR," even before the 15 December meeting (*Narodna volia*, 27 September 1979; *Svoboda* printed it in its 17 January 1980 issue).

The onslaught has also been sanctioned by Valenty Moroz. In a recent "Open Letter to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group Concerning Petro Hryhorenko's Leadership of the so-called 'Western Representation'" Moroz echoes the charges brought forward by the OUN-b, and implies the "treasonous" nature of Hryhorenko's collaboration with the Russians in *Kontinent*. He calls the Western Representation a "caricature" of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and a "farce", and accuses Hryhorenko not only of "immaturity" concerning the national question but of "also building the [Russian] empire." Moroz calls upon the Ukrainian Helsinki Group to formally issue a declaration withdrawing Hryhorenko's official authorization to act as head of the Western Representation, and attacks even the concept of a Western Representation itself, "this 'Ukrainian Group' of which half the members are non-Ukrainian." Moroz feels that Hryhorenko

*has no right to declare himself the representative of Ukraine, the "Western Representative" of a Ukrainian Group. In fact he plays a diversionary role because he creates the impression among non-Ukrainians that Ukraine does not want independence, but wants to work together with Moscow to fight communism within the borders of one state, one empire. . . . People such as Hryhorenko without any knowledge of Ukrainian traditions, with a low cultural-political experience, cannot orient themselves in the West, which is much more complicated than the primitive political system in the Soviet Union, and they easily fall prey to various conjuncturists: these are people who were taken away from wooden ploughs and given computers whose instructions they cannot even read.*

The charges against Grigorenko do not stand up to even the most effortless scrutiny of his article.

1) *The USSR is not a Russian colonial empire.* Hryhorenko clearly states that "The Soviet Union is the successor to the Russian colonial empire." However, he does not posit a direct continuation, claiming instead that it would have dissolved as other empires did. Had not the Bolsheviks "built this empire on different foundations, strengthened and broadened it, and even turned the so-called 'imperial nation' into colonial slaves." Hryhorenko argues that the Soviet colonial empire enslaves even the Russians. Its basis of power is political, through a "partyocracy" rather than the narrow ethnographic basis Moroz and the OUN-b argue for.

2) *Russian imperialism does not exist as an enemy of the Ukrainian people.* Hryhorenko states that the Soviet partyocracy

*strives to dominate the entire world through a world-wide partyocratic empire. Thus this empire is a hazard to the entire world and the light for the decolonization is not the task of any one nation. It is the task of the entire world. To break free of the empire's clutches, to separate from it, is not possible for any one nation alone. . . . [One must] decisively expose the attempts of Russian chauvinist circles in the USSR abroad to identify the concept of*

*"Russie" with all republics of the USSR and the concept of "Russian" with all the peoples of the USSR.*

Hryhorenko once again argues on a political and not ethnographic basis, seeking to avoid the racist association of "Russian" with "enemy of Ukraine."

3) *Moscow is not conducting a policy of Russification and is not enslaving Ukraine.* Hryhorenko states that national inequality was removed in the Soviet Union

*By suppressing all nations, all faiths, all social strata, all levels of culture, into the ways of the new society. . . . If there was a Russian empire, the Russian culture would dominate it. But it doesn't since if it did, would the most renowned Russian writers, musicians, singers, and academic live abroad or isolated in their homeland? In Russia, instead of Russian culture, anti-cultural fascist realism rules over the impoverished language of this people, and is supported and overseen by the partyocracy.*

Hryhorenko also advises Russian human rights activists to

*fight especially firmly the measures of the partyocracy which appear as Russian measures and in this way defame the Russian people. We have in mind such measures as genocide, which the authorities systematically pursue: Russification, exiling original inhabitants of national republics beyond their borders and their replacement by people of other nationalities, the destruction of historical traditions and cultures of non-Russian peoples. . . . Great Russian chauvinism, xenophobia, anti-Ukrainianism, and inflammation of inter-*

*nationalities tensions.*

4) *Hryhorenko, by virtue of his statements and work with the Moscow Helsinki Group and Kontinent is placing himself "beyond the realm of Ukrainian politics".*

Hryhorenko does not feel that it is of benefit for Ukrainians or other groups to work in restrictive and panethnic ethnographic isolation (which Moroz and the OUN-b seem to favour). He has stated (*Narodna volia*, 16 August 1979) that Ukrainians must prepare for the collapse of the Soviet Empire by establishing working relations with its constituent peoples.

*What kind of conflicts will emerge among the eastern countries over borders and so on with regards to the inheritance of this empire? Not then, but now we must conduct a dialogue with the Poles, the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Slovaks and all other nations adjacent to us and with which we have to live not only in the present imperial system, but with which we will have to live in an independent state.*

*When we become independent, we should live in peace and not in war with each other.*

While the arguments raised by Hryhorenko in his article are certainly not beyond criticism, one regrets that, so far, criticism has not been voiced in rational discourse and debate, as Hryhorenko had hoped. Instead, his words have been grossly distorted and used in a smear campaign, the tactics of which suggest dubious motives. It is also regrettable that Hryhorenko, either in person or in writing, was not given an opportunity at the 15 December UCCA meeting to

defend himself, — a "courtesy" which even the Soviet Union seldom denies its accused.

The question of why this campaign has been escalated to such a degree is a valid one. The Ukrainian Democratic Movement, in an appeal published by *Ukrainskyi holos* (13 February 1980) offers the following explanation:

*The [OUN-b] has always appeared before the Ukrainian community in the guise of a representative of not so much the emigration, but more of the Ukrainian people [as a whole] and its liberation struggle. They refer to their underground cadres in Ukraine, which are allegedly numerous. And thus it would be and is very awkward that R. Hryhorenko, L. Plyushch and N. Strokata, and not they, received authorization from Ukraine [to represent the dissident struggle abroad]. It is also inconvenient for them that the Ukrainian Helsinki Group is gaining the growing attention of the Ukrainian people end of the world, which has bestowed upon it and its policies the sympathies of the Ukrainian community abroad. Thus to stop the Helsinki Group's growing strength, the [OUN-b] has returned to methods of combat which are in direct conflict with the interests of Ukraine.*

Moroz stated in his "open letter" that each of the exiled Soviet dissidents "deserves great respect for their steadfastness. But it is a totally different matter when one considers one's relation to [their] positions. . . . Here there should be some selection." We agree. And given a choice between Hryhorenko and the OUN-b, and Hryhorenko and the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, we choose the latter.

Nadia Svitlychna

## My support for Helsinki

Nadia Svitlychna is a former Soviet Ukrainian political prisoner now residing in the United States.

The Ukrainian Helsinki movement arose at a time when many felt that any kind of opposition in Soviet Ukraine had been eliminated once and for all, and that free thought could only lead one onto two roads — one to prison and one to the mire of fear and submission. Towards the end of 1976, the 45 million Ukrainians declared, without paths, that every individual is morally responsible for the fate of both his nation and the entire world. They created a group — the Kiev Public Group for the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords — headed by the author Mykola Rudenko, whose task it would be to inform the Ukrainian public of violations of the Helsinki accords on Ukrainian lands.

The Soviet authorities could not forgive such audacity: within three months of the Group's formation, the repression — arrests, provocations, exile — began.

Although I knew almost all the Group's members, many of them very well, and worked with them from the very beginning, for various reasons I did not feel it necessary to become a formal member myself. At the end of January 1977 the head of Group, Mykola Rudenko, and Oles Berdyuk (once again) approached me with a proposition that I join the group, a proposal which they begged I not refuse. Within a week there was no one to whom I could send a refusal had I wanted — Rudenko had been arrested, and I was to be a witness during his investigation and trial.

Later, I agreed to emigrate to the West, where I had been preceded by Leonid Plyushch

and Petro Hryhorenko. Both of these individuals were continuing in the West the struggle they had waged while in the Soviet Union, and had official authorization from the Ukrainian Helsinki Group to represent it abroad, in Europe and North America, as a Western Representation. Quite naturally, I immediately attached myself to this Representation, regarding it as the most direct link with my abandoned homeland.

In the three years of its existence, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group has experienced very ruthless repression. By the end of 1979 a new wave of arrests dramatically increased the number of imprisoned members of the Group. But their places are constantly being taken by new and courageous recruits, who resolutely resist the militarized state police apparatus.

The most seriously uneven duel is becoming increasingly savage. The attack on the Group has now been escalated, with the clear intention of completely annihilating the Helsinki movement. And it seems that the Western Representation is also one of the primary targets.

Perhaps the most intolerant edge of this inquisition is currently directed towards the head of the Western Representation, Petro Hryhoryovych Hryhorenko — a person of honest and consistent devotion to ideals of justice, a person who has earned himself authority and respect throughout the world, a person with an especially clearly defined position on the question of state independence for

Ukraine. I am not a detective, but in light of this well-planned and aggressively executed campaign against General Grigorenko's person and human rights activity, it is entirely possible that the accident which he had 19 January 1980 with an unidentified taxi [this accident occurred while Hryhorenko was enroute to a conference of committees in Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners (see page 1 of this issue) — Eds.] was not an accident.

At such a grim time for the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, as for the entire human rights movement, I feel it is my civil duty to clearly indicate that I am on the same side of the barricade on which my compatriots in the Ukrainian Helsinki Group are courageously defending human and national rights. I am in complete solidarity with them.

I know that the Western Representation does not have the authority to admit new members to the [Ukrainian Helsinki] Group. As such I do not appeal to them with such a request, but, on the basis of the original proposal by the head of the group and my consistent support and cooperation with the Group, formally announce my official entry into the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. I am informing the members of the Western Representation (Petro Hryhorenko, Leonid Plyushch and Nina Strokata), as well as members of the Group in emigration and in Ukraine of my decision, and assure them that I will strive to disseminate and defend the Helsinki idea to the best of my humble ability.

# The Valentyn Moroz Saga:

The following article attempts to examine one of the most explosive issues confronting the Ukrainian community today — the story of Valentyn Moroz in terms of his piece within the dissident movement in Ukraine, and his relationships with Ukrainians abroad. In doing so it raises many questions about his conduct in prison and in exile in the West, but more importantly it draws public attention to some of the initiatives that the OUN-b has launched over the years in the name of the Ukrainian revolution. More specifically, the author deals with these aspects of the struggle in relation to the even larger question of the role and strategy of the KGB in its efforts to undermine opposition to Soviet policy. Although provocatively conjectural in some of its conclusions, the article presents its case in a clear and logical manner that does not insult the reader's intelligence or maliciously stir up what is already an extremely delicate situation. Its thesis is supported by established facts, the tone of its language is responsible but frank, and it is made quite clear that the author's ultimate intention is to see this crucial issue resolved so that the community can get on with its important tasks in support of the struggle for an independent Ukraine. All of this, however, does not change the fact that the argument of the article is highly controversial and thus is bound to provoke a widely-ranging and passionate response.

It should be noted that a rough draft of the original submission was circulated among a large group of people in Edmonton and elsewhere to gauge possible reactions and to solicit suggestions about its content and style. Opinions naturally varied, ranging from enthusiastic support to cautious criticism of the position elaborated. One group in Toronto expressed apprehension about its publication, fearing the possible repercussions it might have for the student community there; the overwhelming majority, however, felt its claims were reasonable and certainly deserved careful consideration. A significant number went so far as to express agreement with the speculations of the author, saying that the contentions were not only plausible but highly probable. But virtually all of these people also requested that their support of the thesis be kept in the strictest of confidence.

So great is the fear of open discussion in our community that intelligent and mature people are afraid to publicly express certain opinions lest they suffer "unpleasant consequences" for daring to disagree with a particular party line. This is largely why a conspiracy of silence has descended on "the Moroz issue" in our community. That a small but forceful gang of bullies is active in our midst is evident in a long history of slashed tires, threatening phone calls and general intimidation used against any "dissidents" active in organizational politics. A most recent example of this sort of behaviour was provided by the ransacking of the Ukrainske Zhyttie offices in Chicago after they courageously printed an article that was critical of Moroz and some of his "friends."

In recognizing this sad fact of political life in our community, and not wishing to jeopardize the well-being of the author in any way, we have decided to print this article without any signature. We do this with considerable regret because we believe that a free and open discussion of issues is essential to the healthy development of the organized community, and because we believe that critics should take responsibility for the opinions they express. In fact, it is precisely because we are interested in encouraging such a discussion that we now print "The Saga of Valentyn Moroz: A Conspiracy of Silence." For the time has come for the Ukrainian community to leave behind beer hall politics and to embrace, in a mature way, the serious challenges we face as a people today.

The Student Collective

Valentyn Moroz's arrival in the West, initially heralded as a victory for the Ukrainian dissident movement, has since developed into one of the most disturbing events ever to have been witnessed in the political life of Ukrainians in the Western World. His public behaviour and his particular perception of the world have made him the subject of heated controversy. In the months since his release, Valentyn Moroz has evoked a degree of disillusionment and, at times, anger from many individuals of a wide range of political beliefs, many of whom had once been among his most loyal defenders.

Despite the controversy which has surrounded Valentyn Moroz, many facts about his life remain untold. Although public esteem for Moroz has dropped, a myth continues to be perpetuated about him by a small group of his closest followers. This myth is part of a larger confidence game which has sought to portray Moroz as the sole embodiment of the political aspirations of the Ukrainian people. This myth has been aggressively promoted by the leadership of one particular Ukrainian nationalist grouping — the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists — revolutionaries (OUN-r, also designated OUN-b) — as part of a concerted campaign to discredit the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group and, in particular, its Western representatives.

As this campaign has unfolded, it has become tragically evident that Valentyn Moroz and some of his supporters in the OUN-b are attempting to destroy the credibility of the representatives of the Ukrainian dissident movement in the West. At the same time, as if

by some kind of perverse logic, the repressors of the dissident movement within Ukraine — the KGB — have reaffirmed their commitment to crush the Ukrainian Helsinki Group by escalating their campaign to arrest its members. By their failure to support the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, and by their open attacks on the Western representatives of this Group, Valentyn Moroz and the leadership of the OUN-b have inflicted great damage on and have undercut the Ukrainian dissident movement. It is therefore vitally important to defend the Ukrainian Helsinki Group by exposing the sham perpetrated by its opponents — a sham which, by its unfortunate participation in it, could be called the Valentyn Moroz story.

## I The prison years

The Valentyn Moroz story should properly begin in Munich and not in Ivano-Frankivsk. Munich is the headquarters of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-revolutionaries or, as they are popularly known, the *banderivtsi* (OUN-b).<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s the OUN-b was experiencing a crisis within both its leadership and ranks. A dissident movement had begun in Ukraine and the OUN-b was isolated from it, despite many years of claiming that it was the emigre group closest to the forces of resistance in Ukraine. Their political rivals — the OUN-m (*melynkivtsi*) and the OUN-z (*dviikari*) — were periodically publishing *samydydav* literature from Ukraine, translating this literature into other languages, and otherwise showing the world that a viable struggle was taking place inside Ukraine. The rank-and-file of the OUN-b was beginning to question the ability of its leadership to forge links with the Ukrainian dissident movement. Many of them wondered why the allegedly "pro-Soviet" *dviikari* and "opportunistic" *melynkivtsi* were able to maintain contact with the oppositionists while their own organization — which "represents struggling Ukraine" — had not even established a first link.

To compound matters, the *banderivtsi* were both confused and angered by the fact that most *samydydav* from Ukraine did not stress the philosophy of Dontsovian integral nationalism.<sup>2</sup> The entire political superstructure of the OUN-b was built upon the foundation laid by Dontsov in the 1920s and 1930s. It soon became apparent that the huge discrepancy between how the *banderite* press presented the situation in Ukraine, and how it appeared in *samydydav* from Ukraine, was having an impact on the OUN-b's credibility. Reality, as expressed in the *samydydav*, was undermining both the ideology of the OUN-b and its claim to represent the Ukrainian liberation struggle.

This growing gap had to be sealed and the solution turned out to be a young history lecturer from the Western Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivsk. Valentyn Yakovych Moroz was born in 1936, in the Volyn region of Ukraine. He graduated from Lviv University with a degree in history in 1958. In February 1964 he began teaching in the Lesia Ukrainka Pedagogical Institute in Lutsk, and in September 1964 he moved to the Ivano-Frankivsk Pedagogical Institute. In September 1965 he was arrested by the KGB for possession of forbidden literature, he was charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," and sentenced to four years in a labour camp.

In 1967, while in the camp, Moroz wrote an essay which was to catapult him into international prominence. "A Report from the Beria Reserve" was

one of the most powerful attacks on the KGB ever written. Had Moroz written about the nationalities policy, about Russification, or about the lack of democracy, he could have been forgiven. But he wrote about the KGB, and by naming names, places and events, he assured himself the lasting hatred and vengeance of that organization.

In 1970, Moroz was released from the labour camp and continued to write brilliant essays about the situation in Ukraine. By stressing the virtues of patriotism and uncompromising struggle, Moroz rapidly gained the admiration and respect of other Ukrainian dissidents and Ukrainians in the West.<sup>4</sup> As a result of his continued outspokenness, in June 1970 Moroz was rearrested and in November 1970 sentenced to a total of fourteen years' imprisonment and exile — a sentence which was incredibly cruel, considering that his only "crime" was that he had written four essays. Obviously, the KGB was determined to punish him for his indictment of them in his "Report."

At his trial, Moroz again presented an image of a steadfast, patriotic Ukrainian struggling against impossible odds. This was the image which lasted from 1970 until 1979. This was the image which created a massive campaign in the West on his behalf.

The OUN-b followed these events closely. There were many elements in Moroz's writings with which the OUN-b could identify. The Moroz image fitted its needs, and it began to see in this link that it needed. It was far more expedient to feed the OUN-b membership an image of a tortured Moroz, shackled hands held above his head in defiance of the regime, than to have it read Ivan Dziuba's *Internationalism or Russification?*

As a genuine grassroots movement calling for Moroz's release began to grow in the West, the OUN-b



began encouraging its members to believe that Moroz was an adherent of its philosophy. Yaroslav Stetsko, the head of the OUN-b, was especially active in this respect. On a number of occasions he directly referred to Moroz as that member of the Ukrainian dissident movement whose writings most closely reflected the spirit of OUN-b congress resolutions. From Stetsko's point of view, Moroz was practically a member of the OUN-b. He was "living proof" that the traditions of the OUN-b were alive and well in Ukraine. Moroz's writings were used to show that the OUN-b too was in step with the Ukrainian "revolution." Dissidents other than Moroz were considered mere "liberals" who were confused and had to be challenged.

The OUN-b position soon crystallized — human rights and national rights were advanced as being two distinct and separate entities. Moroz (along with the OUN-b) saw the struggle exclusively in national terms whereas the dissidents (Moroz in the eyes of the OUN-b was not a dissident but a fighter) viewed the national question as one facet of the broader struggle for human rights. This position the OUN-b disparagingly characterized as being that of the Russian and Jewish oppositionists. In keeping with this orientation, the OUN-b instructed its membership to form its own Valentyn Moroz defense committees around the world. These committees were to stress Moroz's emphasis on national rights and were to be a vehicle by which the OUN-b could propagate its conception of the Ukrainian struggle.

Meanwhile, in Vladimir prison, the KGB had placed Moroz in a cell with common criminals who constantly abused and physically attacked him. As a result, Moroz demanded to be placed in solitary confinement. This demand was supported by other prisoners, and he was moved. While in solitary he began a hunger strike which he proclaimed would last until either his death or transfer back to a cell with less violent prisoners. When news of this hunger strike reached his wife, Raissa, she immediately informed Russian dissidents in Moscow,

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# Moroz: a conspiracy of silence

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who in turn told Western newsmen about it. This precipitated a mass campaign on Moroz's behalf in the West, a campaign for which Raissa served as a key source of information. This also created a situation whereby the attention of the Ukrainian community and the West was focussed on one figure, Valenty Moroz, at the expense of the hundreds of other Ukrainian political prisoners. The KGB, which in addition to exerting great pressure on Moroz was also closely watching the "Free Moroz" campaign, could not but find this abnormal situation convenient.

As Moroz's hunger strike continued, the OUN-b was becoming increasingly vocal in its claims on Moroz. While this seriously bothered some people involved in the mushrooming defense campaign, the consensus seemed to be that Moroz was close to death and that all other considerations should be put aside in order to save him.

Moroz's hunger strike lasted nearly two months. Eventually he was released from solitary and the campaign in the West subsided.

In 1976 the campaign suddenly gained new life. Moroz's prison term was coming to an end and he was to be transferred to a labour camp where he would serve the rest of his sentence. But first, the authorities sent him to the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow for an examination. The Serbsky Institute is a well-known component of the Soviet psychiatric abuse machine. It was the Serbsky which pronounced Leonid Plyushch and hundreds of other dissidents insane, and sent them off to long terms in special psychiatric hospitals. A real fear existed that Moroz might wind up in such a hospital, confined to an indefinite term of terror. The response was swift and proper. Led by Raissa Moroz, the entire Moroz campaign claimed that he was sane and any attempt to declare him otherwise would be challenged.

The psychiatrists at the Serbsky declared Moroz sane. This was a victory both for the Moroz campaign, and, inadvertently, for the Serbsky Institute, which needed to improve its badly tarnished image.

Valenty Moroz wound up in the severe regime camp in Mordovia where numerous other prominent Ukrainian dissidents were incarcerated. Initially he was welcomed by all the political prisoners in that camp. Yet, as reports from other dissidents indicate, it was not long before only a few remained on speaking terms with him.<sup>8</sup>

From all available evidence, Moroz's conflicts with his fellow prisoners in Mordovia stemmed from a variety of reasons. One was political; Moroz regarded his brand of Ukrainian nationalism as the only correct one and would not tolerate any criticism of it. He claimed that he had a mandate to lead the other Ukrainian political prisoners and demanded that they submit to his will. Moreover, Moroz was well aware of the magnitude of the campaign on his behalf in the West; he used his knowledge to intimidate the other prisoners, telling them that the West would support him and his views alone, for he was the best known political prisoners. This exacerbated the conflict, disorienting and demoralizing the other prisoners.

Another reason Moroz was unable to get along with the other inmates was his authoritarian personality. By demanding strict obedience and not tolerating any deviations from his line, he earned the hatred of almost every political prisoner who had been imprisoned for advocating democratic standards in society. The strictness of the regime in that particular camp further aggravated the existing tensions, the result being that relations among the prisoners were far from cordial. It is no secret that the KGB uses these sorts of conflicts for its own purposes. It is also no secret that during his confinement, Moroz became convinced that he would ultimately end up in the West and play a leading role there within the "Ukrainian liberation movement."

It might be coincidental that Moroz's main antagonist in the camp was Danylo Shumuk. However, a better candidate could not have been dreamt up. Shumuk, a political prisoner for over thirty years in Polish, German and Soviet concentration camps, was already under fire from the OUN-b. He was the author of a controversial manuscript entitled "Beyond the Eastern Horizon" published in 1974 by Smolysky. Almost immediately, a dispute arose over the authenticity, nature and political orientation of the book. The OUN-b took the position that either a Shumuk had chosen to collaborate with the KGB or that the KGB had falsified substantial parts of the manuscript.

It was, in effect, a God-send for the KGB to have Moroz feuding with Shumuk. Moroz, the darling of the OUN-b, was being denounced by Shumuk, a shady-at-best character in the eyes of the OUN-b. Who could have constructed a better scenario? Was it merely by chance that Moroz found himself in the same camp as Shumuk? As this conflict escalated the KGB took an active role in fueling the flames. By showing Shumuk articles from the Ukrainian emigre press in which his memoirs were being denounced by the OUN-b, the KGB instilled in him a hatred for that organization. At the same time, Shumuk was also being shown articles from the same press in which his main enemy — Moroz — was being presented as the national saviour of Ukraine.

In turn, Moroz's messianic visions were being reinforced by both the KGB and the OUN-b. As the conflict deepened, Shumuk began sending letters abroad exposing Moroz and warning others of his behaviour. The KGB encouraged these developments by permitting his letters to reach their destinations in the West. To give Shumuk's views an even greater forum, the KGB sent photocopies of these letters to private addresses of dissidents in Moscow, Kiev, Lviv and other cities, and printed excerpts from them in *Visti z Ukrainy* (a newspaper printed by the KGB solely for distribution among Ukrainians abroad).



The OUN-b saw copies of Shumuk's letters but doubted their authenticity. One cannot really blame them for being sceptical; any letter postmarked Mordovia and sent through the official mails by a political prisoner is highly suspect. This disbelief, however, only gave Moroz greater support in the conflict, and further undermined Shumuk's credibility.

The conflict, however, was not limited to Shumuk versus Moroz. Other political prisoners, all of them highly regarded, soon began openly denouncing Moroz; Mykhailo Osadchy, Bohdan Rebrky, Vasyi Romaniuk and Edward Kuznetsov all took the position that Moroz should be disassociated from the oppositionist movement because of his demagogic behaviour in the camp.

Throughout the dispute, Moroz did not respond to his opponents, either because he felt himself to be above the squabble or he did not have a reply which could hold water.

One could reach a tentative conclusion that the KGB placed Valenty Moroz in that particular labour camp with the ultimate aim of discrediting him as well as the other Ukrainian political prisoners incarcerated there. Knowing Moroz's personality, the KGB could easily have foreseen that sooner or later he could become embroiled in a conflict with almost everyone else in that highly political camp. This they managed to facilitate, hoping to discredit the entire oppositionist movement in Ukraine.

It is difficult to determine without doubt that the KGB's long range plan was to send Moroz to the West. Initially they may have wanted merely to ruin the man and destroy the myth about unity among Ukrainian dissidents, thereby demoralizing their supporters both in Ukraine and the West. This they managed to do with some measure of success from 1974 to 1978. But in 1978 a new opportunity presented itself — a chance to let Moroz loose upon the Ukrainian emigration. No doubt the KGB recognized the potentially divisive consequences that Moroz's presence in the West might have.

## II

### Arrival In the West

In early 1978 two Soviet United Nations employees were arrested in the United States and charged with espionage. Soon afterwards, there was some speculation in the American media that they might be exchanged for Soviet political prisoners, a hope which dissipated when the spies were convicted and sentenced a few weeks later. As this was taking place, a mini "free Moroz" campaign began after years of stagnation. The object of the rejuvenated campaign was to have Moroz released after his prison term ended and sent to the West.

A retrospective analysis can be dangerous, especially in a case as complex as Moroz's. But one factor tends to stand out: the revived Moroz campaign in 1978 coincided with the beginning of negotiations for a prisoner exchange. One explanation for this linkage is that it was in the interests of the KGB to have Moroz's stock rise in value in the event that the exchange materialized. This is not to say that the Moroz committees were consciously serving the aims of the KGB, but that the tempo of the campaign could be influenced in several ways, including the selective release of information. Viewed in this light, Smolysky's publication in 1979 of one of Moroz's strongest essays, "Moses and Dathan," — written prior to his arrest in 1970 — raises many questions. Why did this essay, which the KGB was sure to have in its possession, take over eight years to reach the West, and why did it surface here only a few months before Moroz's release? At the same time, the Ukrainian emigre press began running inserts with Moroz's photo

over the caption "Yes We Want Him!"

Just as the campaign was getting off the ground, Valenty Moroz arrived 27 April 1979 in New York City along with four other Soviet political prisoners. They had just been traded for two Soviet spies.

The first days after Moroz's arrival were joyful and hectic. Moroz was given excellent coverage in the Western media and the Ukrainian question was momentarily brought to the fore. Representatives of various Ukrainian community groups met with Moroz and the first public impressions were that he was a firm, but rational, Ukrainian nationalist. During these days, Moroz seemed to be the 'property' of the entire Ukrainian community, speaking of the need for unity and cooperation between the different groups. It seemed that the KGB's efforts to discredit or destroy him had failed, but these first impressions changed almost overnight.

In his first public appearance in New York City, at a rally in defence of political prisoners and Ukrainian national rights, Moroz told a Ukrainian audience a tale of the cossack Ottaman Sirko, who killed several hundred of his own cossacks who had decided to remain in the Crimea after a military campaign there. Moroz explained that he felt this slaughter was justified because, in his opinion, a true Ukrainian would not remain in the Crimea if given the chance to return to Ukraine. This allegorical tale set off the initial tremors within the community, and left many wondering if it was an indication of Moroz's political orientation.

The first few days of Moroz's freedom must have been frustrating for the OUN-b. Their hero had arrived, but was managing to elude them. Instead of the Ukrainian Liberation Front,<sup>9</sup> it was the Ukrainian National Association in Jersey City which had the honour of sponsoring Moroz's first days in the West. The OUN-b, however, was determined to have 'exclusive world rights' to Moroz, and spared nothing to get them.

To begin with, they managed to convince Moroz, through Slava Stetsko, that his secretary should be Boris Potapenko, an OUN-b functionary working for the World Congress of Free Ukrainians' office in New York. Potapenko's appointment would provide the OUN-b leadership with a crucial link to Moroz. He would be Moroz's guide and protector, explaining to him who's who in the Ukrainian community (in his and the OUN-b's assessment) and generally steering him in the "right direction."

How Potapenko and his superiors in the OUN-b steered Moroz became painfully clear before long.

Farrar Straus Giroux, a major American publishing house, expressed interest in having Moroz write a book about the Ukrainian liberation movement on the basis of his personal experiences. A senior editor of Farrar, in attempting to contact Moroz, called the New York Committee in Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners (CDSP) asking that they relay this proposal to him. This they did: a meeting between Moroz and the publisher took place, and an agreement seemed to be in the works. The publishers offered Moroz a substantial advance, to which Moroz replied that he wanted to write this book not for personal gain but "for the good of the cause." This response seemed reasonable, for he was already receiving large amounts of money from the Ukrainian community.

But a few days later Moroz unexpectedly rejected the offer from Farrar, on the grounds that he would not accept an advance smaller than that given to General Hryhorenko for his memoirs. That Moroz's dignity might have been offended by being offered less money than Hryhorenko may be understandable in light of Moroz's messianic tendencies; but that he should cite money as his reason for rejecting the offer, having previously placed the "cause" before personal profit, is indeed perplexing and most contradictory. But was money really the issue involved? Here Moroz was being given a golden opportunity, by a large American publisher, to promote the Ukrainian question before a wide audience, and yet he turned it down. In sending a word of Moroz's rejection to the publisher, Potapenko also informed them that Moroz would be contacting them shortly with a counterproposal. Not only did no counterproposal follow, but the publisher never heard from either Potapenko or Moroz again. Was this merely a tactless blunder, or was it perhaps that the offer had been tainted from its inception because it came via the CDSP — which the OUN-b labels as being 'leftist'.

That the OUN-b, through Potapenko, was tightening its grip on Moroz was evident in its handling of Moroz's dealings with prominent public figures in the United States. For example, when Moroz was approached by the CDSP with an offer to arrange a meeting with the now deceased George Meany,<sup>10</sup> then head of the American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), Moroz readily agreed. On this basis the CDSP contacted the AFL-CIO, which agreed to meet Moroz and requested that a concrete date be set for the meeting. This request the CDSP relayed to the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), which in turn forwarded it to Potapenko. In fact, both Ivan Bazarko and Walter Dushnyk of the UCCA broached the matter with Potapenko several times. But Potapenko never responded to the request. Moreover, it seems that he never even informed Moroz of the AFL-CIO's willingness to have him meet Meany. Again, another opportunity to influence a key sector of American society was lost, presumably because the initiative had come not from the OUN-b but from the tainted CDSP. When Moroz finally learned that Meany was interested in meeting him, he openly accused the UCCA of sabotaging the meeting. By this time, however, Moroz's

(THE VALENTYN MOROZ SAGA continued on page 10)

# The Valenty Moroz Saga

(continued from page 9)

political statements had become so embarrassing that the AFL-CIO no longer wished to associate itself with him.

As the banderite circle closed around Moroz, his views increasingly became indistinguishable from those of the OUN-b. It was not really clear who was influencing whom, but the ultra-right wing tone in Moroz's statements became ever more dominant. First there was his praise for the Ayatollah Khomeini, then praise for the Somoza regime in Nicaragua; these were followed by attacks on Western Jewish leaders, whom he accused of collaborating with the KGB. In no time at all, Moroz was being viewed by both conservatives and liberals alike as a spokesman for the right-wing fringe.

At the same time, Moroz began to attack those whom he regarded as his political opponents within the Ukrainian community. In his first major speech dealing with Ukrainian community affairs in the West (delivered in Ellenville, New York, on 8 July 1979), Moroz lashed out at two of his fellow dissidents-in-exile, Leonid Plyushch and General Petro Hryhorenko. Both were an anathema to the OUN-b — Plyushch because he was an avowed Marxist, and Hryhorenko because he had stated at the third World Congress of Free Ukrainians that Ukrainians in the West "must take democracy and not fascism into Ukraine." But the unprovoked attack then developed unprincipled, even racist tones. For example, Moroz increasingly referred to Plyushch as an "underdeveloped Ukrainian" — a "Jew" even — and to Hryhorenko as a "Russian." These insinuations, completely false, showed that Moroz was not above resorting to lies in his attempt to establish himself as the sole representative, the *vohzd*, of the Ukrainian liberation movement. This ambition was further revealed by his insistence, during a meeting of activists from defence groups, that he would join the defence committees only under the conditions that he head them and that he alone decide which prisoners were to be defended.

With each passing day Moroz alienated himself from ever-larger segments of the Ukrainian community, at the same time completely isolating himself from his fellow political exiles. His clumsy appeal on behalf of the Catholic patriarchate cost him the support of the Orthodox community; his often ill-considered forays into Canadian politics raised more than a few eyebrows; and his self-serving defence of his divisive behaviour and concept of "holy turmoil" disillusioned even some of his most ardent supporters. Rumours began to circulate about his personal life, surfacing as an issue when in the fall of 1979 he began to publicly attack his estranged wife, Raisa. In an eight-page document, circulated privately, he characterized her as almost being a KGB agent, accused her of wanting all of his money as alimony, and testified his leaving her as a political act. At first people thought that this scurrilous document could only be a KGB provocation, but upon learning of its authenticity they began to wonder if Moroz had taken leave of his senses.

But by then a conspiracy of silence had descended upon the confused and dispirited Ukrainian community. Many, out of regard for the hardships he had suffered, felt reluctant to publicly confront the Moroz issue.

## III

### Is there another chapter

The latest chapter of the Valenty Moroz story is his relentless attack on the Western Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group. Within months of his release, Moroz was already attacking Plyushch and Hryhorenko, both members of the Representation, in harsh and often slanderous terms, the mildest of which was his reference to them as "outdated" representatives of Ukraine of the '60s and '70s.<sup>11</sup> At the same time he referred to himself as representing Ukraine of the '80s, the decade which allegedly would usher in the Ukrainian nationalist revolution in Ukraine. The implication was clear — Moroz, and not the other dissidents, was the "true" representative of the dissident movement in Ukraine.

Recently this campaign has escalated dramatically [see the article on page 7 of this issue for further details — Eds.]. The now infamous OUN-b inspired resolution of the 15 December 1979 meeting of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) marked the first shot in the redoubled campaign, and resulted in the official withdrawal of UCCA support for Hryhorenko and the Western Representation. And Moroz himself has, with his recently released "Open Letter to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group on the Question of Petro Hryhorenko's Leadership of the so-called 'Western Representation,'" elevated the skirmish to the level of a genuine smear campaign. The letter (which grossly distorts Hryhorenko's position) attempts to discredit Hryhorenko's and the Western Representation's authority and calls on the Ukrainian Helsinki Group to officially issue a declaration removing Hryhorenko from the Representation because "he has placed himself beyond the boundaries of Ukrainian politics."<sup>12</sup> The OUN-b is virtually the only Ukrainian grouping in the West which is supporting Moroz in what appears to be his bid to be the representative of dissent in Ukraine.<sup>12</sup>

One can legitimately pose the question of why Moroz and the OUN-b are pursuing this internecine struggle when at the same time the KGB has launched a massive campaign of repression in Ukraine aimed specifically at the Ukrainian Helsinki group. Why,

instead of attacking the Western Representation, are they not defending those imprisoned in Ukraine? An insight into these questions and an example of the hazards involved in Moroz's course of action is provided by two events in the not so distant past.

On 5 January 1972 Yaroslav Dobosh, a young Banderite from Belgium, was arrested in Ukraine by the KGB and charged with anti-Soviet activity on behalf of the OUN-b. This sparked off a massive wave of arrests in January 1972 which imprisoned many leading Ukrainian intellectuals.<sup>13</sup> Dobosh was kept in KGB custody for five months, on 2 June 1972 he appeared at a "press conference" broadcast on Ukrainian television and widely reported in the Soviet press, at which he read a statement confessing to various crimes against the Soviet Union and implicating members of the Ukrainian civil rights movement. Dobosh was released at the intervention of the Belgian government; once in the West, he retracted his "confession," claiming it had been prepared and given to him by the KGB which, under threat of a lengthy prison sentence, coerced him into delivering it. It is estimated that the number of those arrested on charges of conspiring with Dobosh reached into the hundreds, although Dobosh himself met with only a few dissidents. All indications are that the KGB had arranged the Dobosh case in order to

organizations" in Ukraine. Hence the periodic Doboshes and Klymchuks. They are invaluable and indispensable tools in the Soviets' portrayal of the Ukrainian emigre community as a hysterical and reactionary entity, and in their fictitious establishment of an intensive collaboration between this community and the oppositionists in Soviet Ukraine. By induction, the oppositionists are portrayed as being reactionary zealots, an easy target for the KGB.

The KGB continually seeks to compromise the struggle of Soviet oppositionists for human rights, as well as its leaders in Ukraine and abroad. It would like nothing better than to portray oppositionists who employ legal and constitutional means in presenting their cases as illegal right-wing "revolutionaries" operating clearly outside of Soviet legality and in an openly anti-state fashion. It is much easier to justify the suppression of such "dissidents" before world opinion and before the Soviets' own population, who would regard such acts as even beneficial (i.e., keeping their homes "safe" from "hooliganism").

The Valenty Moroz case has all the hazards of the Klymchuk or Dobosh ones. He is already intimately tied to the OUN-b and has himself made enough statements in the West which would suffice to characterize him as reactionary. It remains to portray him as the representative or the archetype of the Soviet Ukrainian dissident movement — a characterization which dissidents in Ukraine reject.<sup>14</sup> The rest is easy (for the KGB). If the world and the Soviet people think that the Soviet Ukrainian dissidents are all Morozes, and if these Morozes are all in compromising collaboration with the OUN-b... what further excuse does the KGB need for wholesale repressions?

An unexpected side benefit for the KGB of Moroz's and the OUN-b's anti-Western Representation campaign has been that the attention of the Ukrainian community in the West has been diverted from the brutal repression of what is increasingly becoming the remnants of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group. In the last few months alone, while Moroz has been "exposing" the threat to the Ukrainians posed by Hryhorenko, the KGB has arrested four members of the Group, sentenced six to terms in labour camps and exiled three others. The total score for the KGB now stands at twenty-three Ukrainian Helsinki Group members in prison or exile, ten in the West and approximately ten still "free," albeit under constant surveillance.

It is time for the Ukrainian community in the West to discuss the issues raised in this article critically and rationally. Many questions must be asked, and answered. Why do certain groups consistently find themselves susceptible to being manipulated? Why are we embroiling ourselves in an internal feud while the opposition in Ukraine is being eliminated? Does the oppositionist movement, which has a broad range of tendencies and persuasions, need a *vohzd*? Why have the dissidents themselves rejected Moroz?

As this article has intimated, these issues are both real and pressing. They demand honest consideration not clouded by ingrained emotionalism. Let's hope that the wag who claimed that the only thing that one learns from history is that one learns nothing from history, is wrong.

## Yes, we want him!

In September 1975, I.S. Hrushevsky, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, told three Canadian MPs, "After his (Moroz's) second arrest, he refused to retract his views and was sentenced to nine years incarceration instead of five years and will therefore be released in 1979. If the Americans will still want him, then they can have him."

Yes, we want him. Write to your senator, representative and member of parliament, telling them of your concern in the matter.



## Ads such as this appeared in the Ukrainian press early in 1979.

provide a grounds for the mass arrests of early 1972 and to tie the Ukrainian civil rights movement to Ukrainian emigre organizations, especially the OUN-b. Vlachoslav Khorov, one of those arrested, himself accused the OUN of complicity in the case:

... I had every reason to declare that the so-called Dobosh "case" is a great soap bubble blown from low-grade KGB soap in order to land the campaign of arrests in Ukraine a certain coloring. The fact that the Dobosh case was a fictitious one and that it was not the reason for our arrests was not concealed even by the KGB in the autumn of 1972, the investigator for Kiev, Korpak, frankly related to me the opinion of the high-ups: "Formerly, we were not getting the right people; we should have been arresting not those who circulate things, but cut off the head, that is, those who write things and organize. Now we have done the right thing — and we shall have pace for a decade or so."<sup>14</sup>

In a similar fashion, a young British student, Andy Klymchuk, was arrested 1 August 1977 while on a tour of Ukraine and charged with smuggling anti-Soviet literature (including "instructions" from the OUN-b) into the Soviet Union. Klymchuk also appeared before a widely publicized "press conference," and also read a "confession," in which he claimed his mission was "financed by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists [OUN-b] and that he was recruited for the campaign by Yaroslav Stetsko. Klymchuk claimed to be "disgusted at the leaders of the OUN" for "constantly intoxicating the minds of the young Ukrainian emigres about Soviet reality" and who "push us towards committing crimes against the Ukrainian people and Soviet Ukraine ... I accuse the organization of involving me in such actions and I am angry with myself and ashamed." Klymchuk's statement was also peppered with lines such as "I have seen here a real democracy, a happy working people."<sup>15</sup> As in the Dobosh case, a new wave of arrests of political oppositionists followed Klymchuk's detention — over twenty were incarcerated in the last half of 1977, concurrent with Klymchuk's stay in Ukraine. And, again as in the Dobosh case, the machinations involved in the Klymchuk affair were so obvious that even the respected British journal *The Economist* (14-20 January 1978) came to the conclusion that "the Banderite organization has been deeply penetrated by Soviet agents: the fact that the KGB appears to have known all about Andrei Klymchuk before he set foot on Russian [sic — Ed.] soil suggests this view."

Both the Dobosh and Klymchuk cases illustrate that the KGB has become quite adept at fabricating links between the OUN-b and Soviet Ukrainian oppositionists and propagating this link in the Soviet media. It makes the KGB's task of suppressing dissent easier. As a result, numerous Ukrainian dissidents have merely been labelled "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" and sentenced to severe terms in prison camps for plotting to "violently overthrow the Soviet state." This method has been successfully employed by the Soviet regime against opposition groups since the 1930s. The fact that the same campaign exists today indicates that the regime lacks inventiveness in dealing with continued internal opposition. After 60 years of "socialism," the Soviet bureaucracy is hard-pressed to explain the existence of "bourgeois nationalist

1. The Banderists are the extreme right-wing faction of a grouping known as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). An illegal and expressly nationalist underground movement, the OUN emerged in 1929 through the amalgamation of various Ukrainian nationalist groupings in Western Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Preparing a potent mixture of authoritarianism, terrorism and integral nationalism, it became the most important Ukrainian grouping of the 1930s in Western Ukraine. In 1940-41 the OUN split into two rival factions, one headed by Stepan Bandera (the Banderists or OUN-revolutionaries, designated as OUN-r or OUN-b) and the other by Andrii Melnyk (the *realist* or OUN-m). In 1954 a third faction, the OUN-z or *divkari* (headed by Lev Rabat and Zennov Malai) was formed by a split in the Banderite wing.

2. Sanyshyn is literally "self-published" clandestinely circulated literature in Ukraine. It has been periodically compiled into a journal called *The Ukrainian Volya* (Ukrainian Herald). The Russian equivalent of samizdat.

3. Oontsovian integral nationalism was the variety of integral nationalism — a highly-filial and militaristic form of nationalism which lexically, expansionist and ultra-nationalist — propagated by Omytro Oontsov (1885-1933), a literary critic, publicist and political theorist of interwar Galicia. Originally a socialist, Oontsov moved to the right for the First World War to become one of the most influential publicists in Western Ukraine. Oontsov was never a member of the OUN but his ideas — voluntarism, fanaticism, national intolerance, unquestioning faith in the ideal of the nation, authoritarianism, nationalism — deeply influenced many of its members. An open admirer of fascist currents in interwar Western Europe, Oontsov was largely discredited by the events of the Second World War, and drifted into mysticism and obscurity in the post-war era.

4. For Leonid Plyushch's account of his first impressions upon meeting Moroz, see his *History's Current*, pp. 222-5.

5. Yaroslav Stetsko (1912- ) currently heads the OUN-b. A Banderite from the organization's inception, Stetsko was Bandera's first lieutenant during the 1940s and headed the ten-day "Ukrainian government" proclaimed by the Banderites in Lviv on 30 June 1941. In 1951 he became chairman of the Anti-Sovietic Bloc of Nations, an extreme right-wing supra-nationalist political grouping, and held the post until its dissolution in 1954. He is married to a Ukrainian woman and has one child, a son, who succeeded by the current chairman, his wife Slava. Stetsko is reported to be in ill health.

6. For example, see the interview with Mykola Budulak-Schargin in the December 1979 issue of *Student* (page 4).

7. For examples of such support, see the following articles in the Banderite Press: "A blueprint for disaster?" (*Ukrainian Echo*, 9 January 1980), "Filialization of interest in the West?" (*Ukrainian Echo*, 6 February 1980), and "Nationalist interest in opportunism?" (*Hornia Ukraine*, 6 February 1980), and "Nationalist interest in opportunism?" (*Hornia Ukraine*, 6 February 1980), and "Nationalist interest in opportunism?" (*Hornia Ukraine*, 6 February 1980).

8. Some of the more well-known dissidents imprisoned as a direct result of the Oobsh case are Leonid Plyushch, Mykhailo Chornyi, and Svylitskyi (pseudonym: Sherkul), Zynovii Ivanukh, Mykhailo Plekhotnik, Vasyi Stus, Danylo Shumuk, Mykhailo Oboedchi, Ivan Huk, Iryna Stasus-Kalynets, and Vasyi Romaniuk. (*See Ukrainian Herald*, Issue No. 6, pp. 10-11, 1979).

9. Moroz's personal wealth is currently estimated to be in the neighbourhood of \$350,000.

10. George Many, who died in January of this year, was well-known as an outspoken anti-communist.

11. These attacks are well documented in the *Ukrainian press*. For example see *Svyoboda* (13 July 1979) or *Student* (September-October 1979).

12. For examples of such support, see the following articles in the Banderite Press: "A blueprint for disaster?" (*Ukrainian Echo*, 9 January 1980), "Filialization of interest in the West?" (*Ukrainian Echo*, 6 February 1980), and "Nationalist interest in opportunism?" (*Hornia Ukraine*, 6 February 1980), and "Nationalist interest in opportunism?" (*Hornia Ukraine*, 6 February 1980).

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14. Vlachoslav Chornovil, "My Trial," *Index on Censorship* 5, No. 1 (Spring 1976): 67.


15. See *Student* February 1978.

16. See the letters by dissidents on page 11 of this issue.

In the dissidents' own words

# Moroz — an assessment by his peers

The following are excerpts from letters written by several prominent Ukrainian dissidents who are currently serving the internal exile portions of their sentences, received for activities in defense of human rights. While many of them had been involved in defense of Moroz in the late '60s and early '70s, the authors' major contention is that Moroz, on the basis of their experiences with him in labour camps, is not to be considered typical of the Ukrainian dissident movement. These letters, which are to be published in the forthcoming issue (No. 3) of *Diyalo*, have all been written since Moroz's release to the West.



Vacheslav Chornovil (b. 1938) had been imprisoned twice prior to his 1972 arrest — in 1966 he served three months for refusing to testify at an illegal trial; and in November 1967 he was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" for compiling materials substantiating his charges of official violations of legality during political trials he witnessed in a journalistic capacity in 1965-66 (eventually published in the West as the Chornovil Papers). Released in 1969, he continued to defend political prisoners, including Moroz, Karavensky, Dziube and Strokata. Arrested in 1972 in connection with the "Dobosh affair", he was tried in 1973 under Article 62 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda") and sentenced to seven years' strict-regime labour camp and five years' exile.

## Вячеслав ЧОРНОВІЛ

7 жовтня 1979

...пишете про новопоявленого месію. Чув, що вже взявся за викладання, а чи напевно працює в Г-лі, отож може менше робити менше колотнечі. Я обмежився тим, що в кількох листах за волю написав, що представляє він тільки себе, і що б не робив — доброго, чи злого — то внявмо його скзистенції, а не "молоді". Розводити полеміку звідси, не значить всіх обставин, не випадає. Та й з чим іншим займатися...

Iryna Stasiv-Kelynets (b. 1940) was active in Lviv cultural circles and, after the 1965-66 arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals, in protests against Russification policies and political repression in Ukraine. She is especially known for her active defense of Moroz and Strokata. She was tried in Lviv in July 1972 and sentenced to six years' labour camp and three years' exile.

## Ірина КАЛИНЕЦЬ

Жовтень 1979

...Знаємо, що Рая молодеш, але терпо мені, коли уявляю її стан — ми знаємо, що значно важче тим, що залишася ще на волі. Бо яка меша сидіти! А Раї довелося пережити куди більше! І я не просто хотіла її заспокоїти, вона й сама повинна відчувти, що всі переваги — і не лише моральні — на її боці. А за Валентина мені соромно і прикро. І якби так, не дай Боже, потрапила до Вас збірка за присяганою Йому ("Дзвони"), прошу її викнути і людям на очі не показувати. Нашкодила той чоловік не лише аморальною поведінкою, а насамперед своєю очманілою "ідеологією", а це вже викондє поза його характер ітд, бо й висвітлює нас всіх нежеже.

14 грудня 1979

...Коли нас особисто без змін, масою вісткую віл Раї, бачу, що вже їй "обжилось" усе — молодеш. Судячи по всьому, наш давній приятель одурів — складає все не лише на умовні "генет.спадок", а й на брак

## Михайло ОСАДЧИЙ

7 травня 1979

...Вн знаєте, любий М., новину з Валентином. Абсолютно розчарувавшис у ньому при сумісному перебуванні в Сосновці, я стверджую своє розчарування його балачками там. Що за філософія: "наступити на ногу — і в жодному разі не вибачитися?" Добре, коли наступлений плохий, а як повертеться — та в піку! Просторікування з філософичним вндом — найслабше місце Валентина, і він швидко, беручись за це, оголить душу і мозок. Дорогий М., нещаслива наша доля. Скільки є швирх інтелектуала — Микола Руденко, Василь Стус, найкрупніший інтуїтивіст отеш Василь, крупні громадські фігури Левко і Зорян, чільні срудити Світличний і Славо — та чимало інших — не потрапили в "п'ятірки", що раз траплялося за десятиріччя, а потрапили звичайнісінькі провінційні міщанини, що заледве десь дотикався культури. А враховуючи рiси характеру і поведінку — стає моторошно...

17 липня 1979

...Відносно колишнього новоприбулого (вірніше, колишнього мого співмешкача в Сосновці), то для мене він став зрозумілим у перші ж місяці мого ближчого знайомства з ним у 76-ому, коли він прибув до нас з Володимира через Сербського. Попередній поєвряння наклали на нього незвиконаний штемпель. Хоча ті, хто знав цього інтелектуального провінціала, повідають, що він і був таким. Він-то ним, але був складений міф. Мн з отшем Васнем, найчудовішою і найпалакгогляднішою людиною з наших у Сосновці, доклали вичерпних зусиль, щоб зробити з Валентина людину. І врештішви, що цього ніколи не станеться, сповістили цілий ряд людей, хто міг би зробити, щоб неоправдан помилка витягнення його до Вас була вчасно вправлена. Але цього не сталося. Ні я, ні отеш Васнь не відповідало ми перед нацією, ні перед історією за те, що до Вас потрапила по-суті компрометуюча українське дисидентство особа... Буль ласка, не плутайте України і Валентина. Не плутайте Валентина і мене з отшем Васнем та ще багатьма і багатьма менш іменитими людьми, хто склав свій розум, життя і натхнення на вістар Вітчизни.



Mykhailo Osadchy (b. 1936); a writer and journalist, was arrested in 1965 for possession and dissemination of samvydav. His autobiographical work *Bilmo* (published in English as *Catact*) was based on his experiences during the two-and-a-half year incarceration and ordeal which followed. His second sentence was based on the charge that Bilmo had been published abroad. Osadchy was tried 4-5 September 1972 under Article 62 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code and received a sentence of seven years' strict-regime labour camp and three years' exile.

19 серпня 1979

А чому авторитет українського дисидентства має впасти через Мороза у Ваших колах, якщо я й отеш Романюк ще з 76 р. дали вичерпну характеристику людям та ситуації! Чи для Вас усіх немає України, немає народу та її інтелігенції, а є Валя М-оз?! Ну що ж, тоді йте на здоров'я... На Україні немає, або майже немає симпатиків Валі. А ось яка магічна сила з допомогою Вячеслава створила авторитет Валі у Вас. І тому тепер ми всі страждали через це! Вас було попереджено вчасно, і Т. не дав об свого імені, а він цілою групою людей. Шо Ви такі легковіри — не на нашії совісті...

Zinoviy Antoniuk (b. 1933) was tried on 8-15 August 1972 under Article 62 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code; specifically he was accused of disseminating the *Ukrainian Herald* and other works of samvydav. Antoniuk was sentenced to seven years of strict-regime labour camp and three years' exile.

## Зиновій АНТОНЮК


5 липня 1979

...І прикро, дуже прикро було мені дізнатися, що Валентин не позбувся свого апостоства. Сповідалося, що час вгнре з його свідомості рудменті серпидночній, що опинившись на Заході, він залоче бути сучасним європейцем. Мій Боже, які ми інфантільні! Чи може європейськ проіятися нашими проблемами, поверити у бажання бути Європою, поверити у саму можливість європейзації! І сьогодні ці актуальні слова Масарика про українців: "нехай доведуть, що вони вже дорізли!"...

Здалося, що ми вже вишши із стану етнографічної свідомості, вишши 60 років тому... Але викондє, що не зовсім. І прикро, що Вінка зустрічав тільки один чоловік.

Чому "середній" євреї мислить політичними категоріями, а середній українець етнографічними? Ажже Україна — то не тільки українці. То і росіяни, і євреї, і поляки, і білоруси, і румуни (молдаванні), і болгари, і греки, і татари, і вірмені, і чеські словаки. В політичному розумінні всі вони "українці". Об'єднує їх в Україну не тільки спільне проживання, а й бажання мати добру собу Україну, усвідомлення спільної долі з українцями.

І в цьому розумінні політично свідомою українців є до всього того, що ділося на Україні, незалежно від того, що діється воно в німецькому, чи європейському середовищі. Він до того зобов'язаний морально (звичайно, не втручаючись до внутрішніх справ). Коли єврей постійно питає про причини анти-єврейства на Україні, то Україну він сприймає як політичне шле. Йому і діла не час, що 173 населення міст України становлять росіяни, що російське середовище на Україні продукує антиєврейство не в меншій мірі, ніж українське, що антиєврейським індукується ізовні як рівновага до зростання національної свідомості. Він звинувачує в антиєврействі українця, свідкою його відповідальним за все, що відбувається на Україні.



ISKRA  
Ikras  
AK 273A

- 1) Volynianochka
- 2) Oi harna ia harna
- 3) Hey-ha/Lety tuzhyve pisne
- 4) Ty moia
- 5) Persha liubov
- 6) Spomyny liia

- 1) Sumerk
- 2) Hey tam na Kubani
- 3> Ty ryva ozhyu/V atbom
- 4) Try trembity
- 5) Ochi syni
- 6) Liubliu prostory



Bohdan Kuzyszyn — drums, percussion, vocals,  
Oles Bundziak — bass guitar, acoustic guitar, electric lead guitar, vocals,  
Jaroslaw Palyiuk — accordion, organ, mellotron string synthesizer, synthesizer, vocals,  
Oles Kuzyszyn — grand piano, Fender Rhodes piano, clavinet, acoustic 6/1 string guitar, electric  
rhythm and lead guitar, vocals.

All Spark, No Fire...

In the six years that Ukrainian-American bands have cornered their share of the contemporary Ukrainian North American music market, they've developed a distinctive approach to their music. Groups from places like New York, Philadelphia and New Jersey have actually created a definitive "East Coast Ukrainian sound" — big band-style Ukrainian waltzes, rhumbas, tangoes and foxtrots, supplemented with the latest electronic instrumentation. All told, it's fun dance music but tedious listening. A dubious tradition perhaps, but one which is nonetheless picked up and tugged to the nth degree by New York's ISKRA.

Released in mid-summer 1979, ISKRA's first effort is almost entirely void of anything which closely resembles redeeming value. I can't recall a more inauspicious and uninspired debut offering. The missing ingredient is heart — a direction of purpose and feeling in what the group is doing. Instead, ISKRA comes up with what at best could be termed a "cute" effort — a basic non-offensive rehash of the same pap we've been served up time and time again.

ISKRA's problems stem from its choice of lacklustre material. A song like "Hei tam na Kubani" would have better been left to share the fate of its contemporary rejuvenator — the Kuban Cossacks. The ensuing array of rhumbas and tangoes are better suited for groups like Tempo and the Bohdan Hirniak Orchestra, who can handle that type of material without sounding insincere. Technically, ISKRA performs the tunes well, but instrumental proficiency can't mask the lack of substance.

The ISKRA album contains only four up-tempo numbers, all of which are played with more pretentiousness than drive and spirit. One of the tunes, Oles Kuzyszyn's own "Ty moia", is a bad take-off on mid-sixties North American bubblegum music. The folk classic "Volynianochka" is reeled off mechanically, without the joy and happiness the song is intended to convey. And Myroslav Skoryk's "Try trembity" (which, by the way, is structured on the same chord progression as Iron Butterfly's immortal "In-A-Gadda-Da-Vida") can't even be saved by Oles Bundziak's intricate acoustic guitar work in the prelude, overlaid on a pre-recorded track of *hutsulski trembity*.

As musicians, the members of ISKRA more than hold their own. But the band's lack of creativity prevents its true talents from coming through. Oles Kuzyszyn is obviously a classically-trained pianist; unfortunately, he often uses classical trills and runs in places where simple blues chording would have been more effective. By the same token, less grand piano and more Fender Rhodes would have enhanced ISKRA's sound considerably. Brother Bohdan's drumming is high hats and cymbals before ISKRA ventures into the studio again; they're overused to the degree of annoyance. Jaroslaw Palyiuk's synthesizer playing is one of the album's few brightspots, particularly where combined with Oles Bundziak's acoustic guitar. Their interweaving is beautifully demonstrated in the lead-in to the well-known *poburova pisnia* "Oi harna ia harna".

ISKRA's vocals are handled well, although too contrived at times. They're entirely lacking in emotional impact and fail to convey the lyrical message of the material. Technically, the album is well produced, with engineering and mixing by Mark Sydorak of Electronova fame. The album cover is strikingly catchy. You may do a double-take when you first see the monogram on the guitar but no, it's not a hammer and sickle.

Like so many other Ukrainian bands, ISKRA has the potential for bigger and better things. All the foursome needs is to find a comfortable repertoire, a feel for its music, and then the drive and depth to go with it. A little more creativity wouldn't hurt either. This time around, on the *Ret Sends Ya 4 Star Rating Scale* — ISKRA scores 1/2.

**Random Notes** — Producer Bohdan Tymyc continues to ply his trade in Montreal, and is rumored to be heading back into the studio next month to embark on yet another album. Tentatively titled *Zoloti Vorota*, Tymyc's latest project will feature the expressive voice of Lida Shewchuk, the vocal mainstay of the *Ballad of Zoriana* album, along with the instrumental talents of keyboard wiz Yourko Kulycky, violinist Roxelana Sawka and a host of others. Look for some surprising new material on this one...  
Disco may be on the way out but you'll never convince Oles Martynowych of that. The lead vocalist and mastermind of New Jersey's immensely popular *Sonlashnyk* orchestra will soon test the tastes of the North American market with an as yet untitled Ukrainian disco release. Martynowych hopes to become the Ukrainian answer to Bobby Vinton, given the record lives up to his expectations and appeals to a listening audience which is rapidly wearying of that insipid musical form.

(RET SENDS YA continued on page 14)

The garrison

Ode to Myron Hyrak who sacrifices his libido in the name of perogies and, no doubt, beer

Somewhat in the style of A. L'bo and others written in emulation and as a variation on a theme, from the right side of Canada under the auspices of Hyrak's vindicator, O. L'bo

There was a time in this fair diaspora when the garrison did not stand. In a "sadoq vshynevei" men and women sauntered about, exchanged ideas, loved and were loved. Then someone bit into a "iablyko" and before you could say, "Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv" — poof — there it was, this garrison rooted smack in the middle of the 20th century psychic frontier. And suddenly "nashi liudy" has this absolute knowledge of exactly how far to venture, precisely what could be spoken of and just whom to love and let love. And that's how the garrison was created. Not very original but of course sentiment overrides innovation. The garrison took upon itself the laudable task of halting the wheels of change, creating a static community and stopping time. The right kind of Utopia. A sort of Ukrainian still point. Idyllic, yes. But life within the garrison can be somewhat limiting. The garrison judges, condemns, ostracizes, occasionally burns at the stake. Figuratively speaking. It defends dissent with a vehemence in the "bat'kivshchyna" but labels it all sorts of colours (excepting blue and yellow) when evinced within its own fold, under its own nose, next to its own heart. Politically, socially, tidally and personally, the purgè permeates all levels of intercourse. Below the belt and into the pocket, economics play their role too. The garrison is omniscient. It knows all. It knows you. It knows what you're thinking even before you're thinking it and in spite of if you're thinking it. It is never wrong. It is intangible. It is arbitrary. It will not hesitate to decimate. And so it remains pure. But what of principles? Ah, the Ukrainian Catch 22. Possibly most so in January. Question and thou shalt be questioned. Protest and thou shalt be protested. Without dialogue, without recourse. A reflex action, without thought, with no humanity. Now we're hitting hard. But still disguised in the tingle, tangle of words, that as yet have no meaning because they have no respect because there is no cognizance, we're alright. We? I mean I. But it takes courage to say I. A caring, concerned, responsible I, that sees much ill and ignorance, one harnessing the other and straddling the other. Beast with two backs. Insidious intent. The women who come and go speaking of "varenyky" and someone else's daughter. The garrison is strong. It is secure. It is safe. Also sordid, squalid and sick. It's all in the perception. Of which there is too little. Tryzub and trinity. In that order. "Ia liubliu Ukrainu, ia liubliu Boha, ia liubliu studentstvo." In that order. Order is all. "Just trying to understand the historical phenomenon." Beware. Comprehension reads subversion in the garrison. Toe the line or fall prey to the grand inquisitor. Or didn't you know. The gift (or is it burden) can be too much to bear, especially for those who blaspheme in its name. The inquisition cometh. Already, they're gathering the wood. And marching in the garrison "Strunko!" one beat one voice

"We must unite, we must we must!"  
But why?  
"We must!"  
Why?  
"Must!"


Your face is tear I do not see it  
Your voice is hate I do not hear it  
Your hand is force I do not feel it

I am anger and I am ardour winds of the frontier above and beyond and through the garrison winds of the frontier

relentless lovers that will not abate

And so Myron this is how it is. From prose to poetry. Drama and comedy. But take my hand kuz you're kul and just don't tie me to the stake. Kuz when I go, you go too.

O. L'bo





Kolumn-eyka is our newest column. This is the second month in which it has appeared, and we hope to make it a regular feature. Its purpose is to provide a forum for the discussion, review, and development of topics in Ukrainian dance. We call on all interested parties to contribute. Send all submissions to Student, #206, 11751 - 95 Street, Edmonton, Alberta, T5G 1M1.

## Three Ukrainian jazz dances

Demjan Hohol

Three dances attempting to combine traditional Ukrainian stage dance with jazz dance were presented at a recent concert held in Winnipeg. Entitled *Ukrainian Contemporary Music and Dance*, it was sponsored by the Winnipeg Ukrainian Students' Club and Manitoba Ukrainian Canadian Committee (KYK) as part of Winnipeg's Ukrainian week activities. The very title of the concert suggests the animosity which has greeted new artistic forms in a culture which nostalgically values 19th century Ukrainian peasant life — a remnant of the Romantic philosophy to which Shevchenko subscribed and which Franko grew out of.

The concert was a good one, entertaining and varied, although not particularly well attended, as is the norm for Ukrainian concerts in Winnipeg. The older members of the audience quite noticeably displayed their unwillingness to appreciate some of the program's items, which they obviously felt had strayed too far from their concept of Ukrainian folk tradition. Nonetheless, KYK's support and the thousand-odd attendance may help to further stimulate Winnipeg's insular North End ghetto youth to cast aside their fears of expressing their own experience of the Ukrainian phenomenon, rather than dwelling only on that which their parents and grandparents demand of them. The encouraging initial support which the performers did receive is an affirmation of the desire to continue developing Ukrainian culture, rather than lazily putting it into the Oseredok Archives and Museum as a relic of the past.

**Vodohrai:**  
The first dance of the concert was performed by Orlan ensemble. I am told that it is an older dance, first performed by Rusalka and commissioned by them from the Ukrainian dancing demigod Roman Stroc'ky of New York. The dance is choreographed to Ivasiuk's "Vodohrai", and is extremely boring and repetitive.

The story line contrasts four girls doing super-simple jazz movements with four 19th century Ukrainian kholop. The boys mock the girls, grotesquely imitating their movements. The girls steadfastly and austere remain unperturbed, until the leader of the boys' pack gassed up with all this nonsense. The boys compose themselves and chase the girls from the stage with a display of their manly prowess at doing *prysiadky*. Hooray! Ukrainian national romantic innocence has vanquished the evil and decadent Western contemporary society.

**Try Braty:**  
The second dance was choreographed by Peter Pawlyshyn and performed by Winnipeg's CYMK Dancers. The choreography emphasizes the dominance of the macho man in Ukrainian dance, by contrasting dull, whitewashed girls with three expressive male character roles. The story line is again one of conflict. Ukrainian court dance — very stately, supposedly dignified and ever-so-slow — is personified in one brother, who escorts two girls. The second brother and his partners appear to have entered this dance from a contemporary stage *hopak* — the boy especially displayed the desired fast, flashy, give-audience-all attitude.

Both brothers challenge the third brother to beat them at their own particular style of dance. The challenged, however, is well capable of beating them at their own game, presumably proving his right to a '50s rock'n'roll style of bobbysock dance. All parties concerned then join the whippersnapper in his style of dance. Golly Geez! Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist pigs, sit on it! Let him do his own thing, man....

**Dva Persteni:**  
The third dance was performed by Lesia Richlewski of Orlan. If jazz or any other dance form is to be presented by a Ukrainian dance group, it should be done so on the level which this selection was performed. This tall, feathery-light figure gave the gutsy and exciting performance of a dancer, not just of a person interested in Ukrainian dance. Her heart, mind, and body seemed to be completely tapped in a give-it-all attitude. Lesia confidently confronted the audience in a contemporary Las Vegas style presentation complete with long silver streamers, bright lights, and a transparent silver mesh across the entire front of the stage, giving the dance a dreamy effect.

No theme existed in this dance. It was merely the dance of a young girl confident of an identity which combines two worlds, two cultures, into a mixture appealing to both. One must have extensive knowledge of both dance forms in order to do justice to either, as the concert's first two dances illustrated. In "Dva Persteni", neither culture was threatened. The beauty and grace of the Ukrainian woman was preserved, and the general flow of the dance's turns and steps paralleled the movements of contemporary Ukrainian choreography for women.

This dance was undoubtedly the concert's highlight. Unlike the first two dances, Lesia did not feel it necessary to apologize to either culture, while at the same time felt compelled to present her idea.

Who will now stage the first Ukrainian punk rock pogo?

## late night discourse of an apprenticing madman

the street lamp is blazing through the window onto my bed  
so late at night encouraging my anger at myself for not having been asleep hours ago  
tomorrow going to be a busy day

awake frustrated it's difficult i need to write convincingly properly

about everything

about the lovehate respect — wariness relationship between the german and russian peoples baking boiling burning since Charlemagne's military rebuttal against slavs pushing pushing westward...

brothers battling in the russian occupation of east germany

two mountains in gida's (grandfather's) folk tale banging against each other

two huge breasts of Mother Earth bruising each other as she runs on in time (will one, perhaps be removed due to cancer? what if the cancer isn't caught in time?)

about Mother Earth a sprinter raped at the Politympics hitlers and brezhnev and terrorists. No politicians of all kinds applauding smiling every Mother crying

about my ukraine my ukrainia one of my mothers can i ever, ever write the words that will cause you the world to open your eyes from sucking and discover that my mother is your mother that your mother is mine?

you feel so much of your own pain why am i compelled to force upon you still more? when i also am well aware that the meek find it so difficult to pity other meek?

will i forever ever remain to you screaming ranting ravings slobbering ridiculous another flag-waving ukrainian chauvinist pig? a simple misguided romantic?

now i am tired temporarily defeated until tomorrow when i'll try again to write

about everything

about you

Mykola Rush



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Diyaloh is a new Ukrainian language journal devoted to a critical socialist analysis of developments in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. The second issue has just been released. Contents include: an interview with Borys Levytsky on the nationalist movement during the Second World War; the opposition in Poland; Iran, 1953-79; Workers' movement in Romania; Czechoslovakia's Charter 77; Chronicle of current events; and a review of Bahro's *The Alternative in Eastern Europe*. Price per issue is \$1.00. Subscriptions per year are \$3.00 (three issues).

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## Ret Sends Ya

(continued from page 12)

**Collectables** — Imagine for a moment, if you will, seven veteran session jazz musicians with no background in Ukrainian music getting together in the studio to record swing renditions of folk melodies like "Arkan", "Hopak" and "Verkhovyno". Implausible as it seems, that's exactly the combination you get when the **Sai Defeo Swing Sextet** realizes Ukrainian music can be fun, producing the album **The Ukraine Swings (U-TAB 201S)**. Recorded back in 1962, **The Ukraine Swings** stands out as a monument to efforts at developing Ukrainian jazz music on the North American continent. Sadly, nothing has been done in this realm since **Sai Defeo** took a chance on adapting jazz arrangements to Ukrainian folk music 18 years ago. All 12 numbers on this now-deleted album are given the full swing/jazz treatment, with a touch of Dixieland thrown in for good measure. By and large they all work well, leaving one with a desire for repeated listenings. **The Ukraine Swings** is all the more interesting in that only two Ukrainians were involved in the entire production — recording engineers **Volodymyr Zmij** and **Jerry Nedlisky**. The accompanying liner notes for each song are an added bonus, as is the delightfully surrealist album cover. This album is a definite must for the contemporary Ukrainian music buff, but you'll have to keep a sharp lookout for it. The only place I've seen it in stock is at the **Surma Bookstore** in New York.

**On the Soundscape** — Last month, **Ret Sends Ya** promised to shed some light on the confusing **Melodyia Records** labelling code for those interested in music from Soviet Ukraine. Unfortunately, due to lack of space, it will have to wait until next month's **Student**.

Next Issue — *A touch of class, with Toronto's Suzirya.*

## Defense

(continued from page 1)

upcoming Madrid conference to review the Helsinki Accords, recognize the fact that the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, despite

severe repressions from its inception, has a corresponding official representation abroad in the persons of General Petro Hryhorenko (head), Leonid Pliyushch and Nina Strokata,

- assert the importance of moral, political and financial support of the Ukrainian community for the Western Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, especially now, before the Madrid review conference, when the KGB in Ukraine and abroad is by all available means attempting to destroy the Helsinki movement,
- regard as particularly harmful the disgraceful resolution attacking General Hryhorenko which was adopted at the 15 December 1979 session of the UCCA national council,
- call on the Ukrainian community to firmly oppose the slanderous campaign which has been launched against the Helsinki movement.

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**TORONTO:** U of T USC managed to tap the enthusiasm generated by the multitudinous festivities of "Rizdvo" this year in launching its second semester of club activities for the 1979-80 academic year.

The 17 January 1980 general meeting saw a turnout of 80 people and featured guest speakers Tina Hawrylyshyn of the CDSPP, speaking on defence work for political prisoners, and Jars Balan, who talked extensively of Student needs, aims and objectives, and the advantages of living in renaissance-ville, Edmonton. A second meeting 6 March 1980 drew out more than 60 USC zealots to discuss Ukrainian Week plans and tactics, all engineered by Michael Gedz, Ukrainian Week chairman.

And speaking of Ukrainian Week, Toronto's academic milieu was turned inside out when USC members unleashed their forces 11-16 February. Starting with an opening ceremony presided over by President Ham (who literally cut the kobbassa and declared Ukrainian Week officially open), events were well attended and enjoyed by all. More than 300 people turned out for the Thursday night cabaret which featured comedienne, Luba Goy, singing troupe, "Suziyya," Roman Pitachka on bandura, dancers and more. Mike Buchynsky of the York club kept everyone entertained in his role as M.C. of the evening.

Highlight of the week was the Promin' zabava which brought close to 1100 young people out to celebrate the culmination of Ukrainian Week, undoubtedly a record turnout for any local zabava. U of T USC is still reeling from the kaleidoscops of 16 February evening and the success of all Ukrainian Week events.



Boridan Ivan

**SASKATOON** — This January members of the Saskatoon Ukrainian Students' Club were visited by Dmytro Jacuta, SUSK President. Seen, in this photo, standing in front of the Mohyla Institute are some of the club's executive members (L-R Ivan Hryn, Melody McLean, Dmytro Jacuta, and Kathy Zaporuk). Recently, the club organized a cultural display and activities on campus, as part of "Ukrainian Students' Month." Although the club is having one of its best years in recent memory, executive members view this year cautiously.

They see it as a year of re-building and speak of better things to come.



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